




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JPRS Report

Central Eurasia

Military Affairs

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CIS/RUSSIA ARMED FORCES

Temerko on Committee for Social Protection of Servicemen

92UM0947A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
9 Apr 92 First Edition pp 1, 3

[Interview with Aleksandr Temerko by A. Zhilin: "The Russian Government Knows About the Needs of the Military"]

[Text] From the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA dossier. Aleksandr Temerko was born in 1951. He completed the Moscow Machine Building Institute and worked at a construction project.

In the following years he was the deputy director of one of the largest housing construction associations in Moscow and the director of the sectorial center of the USSR Ministry of Lumber Industry and the president of the Russian Military-Industrial Association.

On 3 January 1992, he was appointed the chairman of the Committee for the Social Protection of Servicemen Under the RSFSR State Committee for Defense Questions.

[Zhilin] Aleksandr Viktorovich, at present so many various factions, associations, committees have arisen and they proclaim that they will provide social protection for the servicemen and their families since the state is incapable of this. Inevitably among some the impression has been gained that the Russian government is standing on the sidelines of these problems.

[Temerko] I feel that there is nothing reprehensible in establishing such social organizations, if of course their deeds do not diverge from their words. But I would assert that the government is profoundly aware of the needs of the servicemen as can be seen by the creating of our committee at the end of last year. The initiators of this were Army Gen K. Kobets, Col Gen P. Grachev, the deputy chairman of the government A. Shokhin and myself. The idea of establishing in the Russian Federation government a special structure which would be directly involved with the solving of the social problems of the Army and Navy was supported by Mar Avn Ye. Shaposhnikov, by the Minister for the Social Protection of the RSFSR Population E. Pamfilova and later also by the Russian President B. Yeltsin.

[Zhilin] Your committee exists under the State Committee for Defense Questions and this probably will be incorporated in the structure of the Russian Ministry of Defense. Clearly this is not an accidental coincidence?

[Temerko] I will not try to be smart: last year we were convinced that sooner or later a military department would be established in Russia and we were ready within this department to solve the problems resting on us. At the same time I feel that the Committee for the Social Protection of Servicemen will be necessary only during the transition period, the period of reducing the Armed

Forces and the restating of the troops on Russian territory. Proceeding from this we must also be concerned with the professional military who are being discharged and retired into the reserves. As a general figure this is some 6 million persons who are waiting for aid and support in this difficult time of converting to the market.

But the fact that the committee will operate within the future Ministry of Defense, I feel, in no way will hinder its status. Both the Presidential decree and the Government Decree of 31 January 1992 state that the Committee for the Social Protection of Servicemen is a state administrative body under the Ministry of Defense. In other words, its tasks include coordinating the activities of the Russian Federation state administrative bodies in the area of resolving the problem of the social and housing-domestic support of the servicemen, the persons discharged from active military service as well as the members of their families.

[Zhilin] What is the committee's structure?

[Temerko] Let me say straight away that it is small, numbering some 25 servicemen and 85 civilian co-workers. Duties are distributed among them according to the range of problems that we are solving. The main one is the construction of housing for the servicemen. Correspondingly we have people who analyze both the situation itself as well as the ways for emerging from the crisis. There is also a legal group which cooperates with the legislative bodies, an economic one which maintains ties with the Central Financial Directorate of the CIS Joint Armed Forces, banks, various commercial structures as well as a group monitoring logistic support for the Armed Forces.

Within the month, representatives of the committee will be appointed from among the servicemen in all the military districts and fleets. This will be done with the agreement of the district and fleet commands as well as the local administration. At the same time our representatives will have a sufficient degree of independence from the local leadership.

[Zhilin] Aleksandr Viktorovich, please tell us what you have been able to accomplish over the previous 3 months?

[Temerko] In the first place, it is difficult to speak about the social protection of the servicemen without having the corresponding legislative base. At present the Army and Navy are precisely in such a situation. For this reason, we have started with active participation in preparing the Decree of the Russian President on Supplementary Measures Relating to the Social Defense of Servicemen. Currently our committee has worked out a draft law on the social guarantees for servicemen on Russian territory. This in a way will supplement the draft law on the status of a serviceman and our specialists are also involved in working this out.

In addition to this, a series of government and Presidium of the Supreme Soviet decrees has been prepared. Among these is the order of the Presidium Chairman R. Khasbulatov, which defines the procedure of interaction between the local authorities and our committee. Here the main thing is that the concerns for the material and domestic support of the servicemen from now on be the prerogative of just one center. The local authorities should also know under what conditions the officers, warrant officers and their families are living, and what food and industrial goods there are in the garrison stores; this should become a real "headache" for them. In particular it has been decided that in each obispolkom there will be a special position introduced and a specific person will be concerned with "army" questions.

Naturally a serviceman can also turn directly to the committee in Moscow. We are presently organizing a public reception office and I can assure you that not a single complaint will remain unattended to.

[Zhilin] That is, the committee will assume monitoring functions?

[Temerko] Naturally. But it is not so much that people can come to Moscow for "justice." We shall monitor on the spot how the decisions adopted on this highest level are being carried out. For example, on returning apartment debts to the servicemen. And this will not be mere formal supervision. We shall meet with the oblast administrations, and we shall work out ways to emerge from the arising situation in one or another region. For instance, very productive and constructive work has been done in Moscow Oblast. Together with the Main Billeting Directorate of the Armed Forces, specific proposals have been prepared on the construction of cottages as well as developing the required production capacity for this.

We also have our own special purpose programs. For example we are organizing a holding of apartments which the servicemen will be able to buy at very moderate prices. The price reductions will be achieved by various ways. There is also agreement with a number of oblasts on acquiring so-called shells in the form of housing framing which is standing empty because of the lack of "stuffing." We shall help the servicemen secure bank credits on easy terms, we shall call in powerful commercial structures for providing financial aid such as Menatep. Let me add that the work is being carried out not at random, but soon a very concrete government decree will be issued on providing housing space for the servicemen. Here it will be spelled out how many apartments the Armed Forces will obtain and from what sources.

The committee has already some accomplishments in other areas, for example, in developing private farms. Agreement has been reached with the leadership of six oblasts—Moscow, Leningrad, Novgorod, Pskov, Voronezh and Tula—on the development of the infrastructure for discharged servicemen. Tula Oblast, for

instance, is prepared to take 5,000-7,000 families. And these are just the first steps. Our research conducted jointly with the Committee for Personnel Work of the CIS Joint Armed Forces has shown that more than 30,000 serviceman families are ready to link their lives to the countryside with suitable conditions present. It is our task to create such conditions.

[Zhilin] One last question: How will the Committee for the Social Protection of Servicemen get out information on its activities to those in whose interests it is working?

[Temerko] We are counting primarily on KRASNAYA ZVEZDA and the district newspapers. In addition we are working on the question of creating a weekly newspaper entitled ARMIYA ROSSI [Russia's Army] with the founders of this being the Command of the CIS Joint Armed Forces, the Russian Ministry of Defense and our committee. This will be a sort of information bulletin. Without explaining the social policy of the Russian President and Government, without detailed legal consultation on the documents being approved, we will not achieve much. We should make every effort so that every man in uniform is constantly aware that he is not alone and that the state is concerned for him.

Lt-Gen Zolotov On Status Of Spring Draft

92UM0946A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
9 Apr 92 First Edition p 2

[Lieutenant-General L. Zolotov interviewed by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Colonel A. Olynik: "Timely Interview: Spring Draft Will Be Difficult"]

[Text] The decree of the Russian President and order of the Commander in Chief of CIS Joint Armed Forces on calling up Russian Federation citizens for military service in April through June 1992 and on discharging into the reserves soldiers, sailors, sergeants, senior sergeants, and military construction workers who have completed their set terms have been published.

At KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's request, Lieutenant General L. Zolotov, chief of staff of the Moscow Military District, told about preparations for and the organization of the spring draft.

[Zolotov] Judging from the facts, this year's draft campaign will be far more difficult and complicated than last fall's. All preparatory work has been completed in accordance with plans confirmed by the Moscow Military District staff. The study of conscription resources has been finished, calculations have been made with respect to carrying out the draft, and the availability and qualitative characteristics of draftees have been clarified. Work periods for draft commissions have been set, facilities for draft offices have been chosen and equipped, and questions relating to draftees' medical examinations have been resolved. But the problem is that Russia still has no law specifying procedures for training young people for service and drafting them for active military service as soldiers, sailors, sergeants, and

senior sergeants. Some draftees' parents have been quick to take advantage of this. Many of them have begun protesting against their sons' being drafted for service and have started setting conditions or declaring where and in what capacity their children should serve. For example, here is an excerpt from a resolution adopted by a so-called meeting of parents in Kursk Oblast known as the Movement Against Violence, which was sent to the Kursk Oblast military commissariat: "The meeting of servicemen's parents decided to demand the dissolution of all construction and road-building units; to boycott the spring and fall draft of young people for those units; that special forces units in Kursk be staffed with conscripts from Kursk and Kursk Oblast; and that draftees with families or grave family situations serve only in Kursk Oblast."

The absence of a Russian Federation law on military service is also having an adverse impact on efforts to register citizens born in 1975 with draft offices. Young men of 16 and 17 years of age are refusing to report to military commissariats for military registration. As of March 26, 1992, more than 14,000 men failed to report for registration in the district as a whole—more than four percent of them without valid reasons. Unfortunately, Moscow "leads" in this area, with 14.6 percent.

Another problem is that the district military commissariats' registration rolls include conscripts from other sovereign states who studied at secondary specialized educational institutions and vocational-technical schools. Most of them are subject to the draft, but no decision has been taken as yet as to how to proceed with respect to them. The question of training military technical specialists at training organizations of the Joint Sports and Technical Society (the former DOSAAF) and of the vocational-technical education system remains unsolved. The funds appropriated for these purposes for 1992 were sufficient only to train specialists for the spring draft.

[Oliynik] During every draft there are quite a few difficulties having to do with draftees' health. What is the situation today?

[Zolotov] It's bad. In many parts of the country, including oblasts within our district, the public health service is eliminating its adolescent service. Virtually nothing has been done to organize treatment for illnesses detected among young people. Meanwhile, overall morbidity among draftees is on the rise. According to the results of draftees' medical examinations, morbidity rose in 1991 by almost six percent in comparison with 1990. The largest percentage of disease was found in Moscow—47.2 percent. It is an alarming figure, but to all appearances, it doesn't especially concern anyone.

Problems are also arising with respect to draftees' medical examinations. In some places, there is a refusal to make available medical specialists and junior medical personnel for draft commissions and to provide space in preventive-treatment facilities for conducting in-patient

and out-patient examinations. The main reason is a demand that the CIS Joint Armed Forces High Command pay all the expenses, even though in the past such expenses were paid from the budgets of local governments. There is also a considerable lack of clarity as concerns paying technical and transport workers who are hired for the draft period.

To sum up, owing to various reasons, such as health, family status, continuing education, employment in special branches of the national economy, and so on, we can draft only 25 of every 100 youths. Our army is becoming a workers and peasants army and its losing its intellectual level.

[Oliynik] Leonid Sergeyevich, what can be done?

[Zolotov] I think the solution lies in enforcing the laws in effect, and in the immediate adoption by the Russian government of a number of measures with respect to the spring draft, in keeping with the agreement signed by the CIS chiefs of state in Kiev. Everything that depends on us and the military commissariats we are doing. But society as a whole has to take an interest in solving defense problems.

Membership of State Commission to Create Russian Defense Ministry

92UM0928B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 14 Apr 92 First Edition p 2

[Presidential Order: State Commission for Creation of the Ministry of Defense, Army and Navy of the Russian Federation; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] We in publishing in the Saturday edition of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA the interview with Colonel General Dmitriy Volkogonov, the chairman of the State Commission on Creation of the Ministry of Defense, Army, and Navy of the Russian Federation, promised to provide readers with a complete membership list of the Commission. We are carrying out our promise by publishing the text of the order issued by the President of the Russian Federation.

State Commission on Creation of the Ministry of Defense, Army, and Navy of the Russian Federation

1. To create the Ministry of Defense, Army, and Navy of the Russian Federation, to be organized is the State Commission (henceforth referred to as the "commission"), which is to consist of the following members:

Commission Chairman

VOLKOGONOV, D. A.—Colonel General; advisor to the President of the Russian Federation on Defense Matters.

Commission Deputy Chairmen

GRACHEV, P. S.—Colonel General; first deputy defense minister, Russian Federation.

KOKOSHIN, A. A.—first deputy defense minister, Russian Federation.

KOBETS, K. I.—Army general.

SKOKOV, Yu. V.—State advisor, Russian Federation.

Commission Members

AFANASYEV, S. A. - member, President's Council of Experts, Russian Federation Government.

BERDENNIKOV, G. V. - deputy minister of foreign affairs, Russian Federation.

BUKREYEV, Yu. D. - Colonel General; chief, Main Staff, Ground Forces, CIS Unified Armed Forces.

BURLAKOV, M. P. - Colonel General; commander, Western Group of Forces.

VOLKOV, B. M. - Major general; deputy chief of staff, 12th Main Directorate, CIS Unified Armed Forces.

VOROBYEV, V. V. - Lieutenant general; chief, Central Finance Directorate, CIS Unified Armed Forces.

IVANOV, V. L. - Colonel general; chief, Space Units, CIS Unified Armed Forces.

KOGATKO, G. I. - Lieutenant general; chief, Railway Troops, CIS Unified Armed Forces.

KAPITANETS, I. M. - Admiral of the fleet.

KOLESNIKOV, M. P. - Colonel General; chief, Main Mobilization Organization Directorate, General Staff, CIS Unified Armed Forces.

KOROTKEVICH, P. L. - first deputy chairman, President's Economic Council, Russian Federation Government.

KOTYLEV, N. I. - Major general; chief, Main Billeting Directorate, CIS Unified Armed Forces.

KUZNETSOV, L. V. - Colonel general; chief, Main Operations Directorate, General Staff, CIS Unified Armed Forces.

KUNTSEVICH, A. D. - chairman, President's State Committee on Conceptual Problems of Chemical and Biological Weapons, Russian Federation.

LOBOV, O. I. - chairman, President's Council of Experts, Russian Federation Government.

MALEY, M. D. - state advisor, Russian Federation.

MALYUKOV, A. I. - Colonel general of aviation; chief, Main Staff, Air Force, CIS Unified Armed Forces.

MIRONOV, V. P. - Colonel general; deputy commander for armaments, CIS Unified Armed Forces.

MIRUK, V. F. - Colonel general; first deputy commander, Air Defense, CIS Unified Armed Forces.

NECHAYEV, E. A. - Lieutenant general of medical service; chief, Main Military Medical Directorate, CIS Unified Armed Forces.

NIKITIN, V. N. - Major general; first deputy chief, Department of Law Enforcement Agencies, Security and Defense, State Legal Directorate, for the President of the Russian Federation.

OMELICHEV, B. A. - Colonel general; first deputy chief, General Staff, CIS Unified Armed Forces.

PISKUNOV, A. A. - deputy chairman, Supreme Council Committee on Defense and Security, Russian Federation.

RODIONOV, Yu. N. - Colonel general; chief, Main Personnel Directorate, CIS Unified Armed Forces.

SERGEYEV, I. D. - Colonel general; deputy commander, Strategic Forces, CIS Unified Armed Forces.

STAROVOYTOVA, G. V. - Advisor to the President, Russian Federation.

TEMERKO, A. V. - chairman, Committee on Social Security for Servicemen, Russian Federation Government.

TITKIN, A. A. - Minister of Industry, Russian Federation.

FUZHENKO, I. V. - Colonel general; deputy commander, CIS Unified Armed Forces; chief, Rear Services, CIS Unified Armed Forces.

FILATOV, S. A. - first deputy chairman, Supreme Council, Russian Federation.

CHEKOV, N. V. - Colonel general; deputy commander for construction and troop billeting, CIS Unified Armed Forces.

SHAKHRAY, S. M. - State advisor, Russian Federation.

YASHIN, Yu. A. - chairman, President's State Technical Commission, Russian Federation.

2. The legislative act establishing the Ministry of Defense, Army and Navy of the Russian Federation is to include a list of all the Armed Forces arms and branches, installations, and schools designated for inclusion into the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation. The formation of the Ministry of Defense, Army, and Navy of the Russian Federation is to be accomplished within the period of one month following the day of signing of the order.

[Signed] President, Russian Federation

B. YELTSIN

4 April 1992

Discussion of Ustyurt Chemical Test Range
92UM0928A Moscow TRUD in Russian 15 Apr 92 p 4

[Article by TRUD special correspondents V. Biryukov and V. Karpov: "Beating Swords into Plowshares in the Aral"]

[Text] The military airfield lay hidden in the sands. There were islands of snow and ice on the airstrip. A person could already feel the warmth of the sun. The landscape was simple, with rows of barbed wire and watchful guards. The minutes of waiting were agonizing. All of a sudden the long-awaited order was given.

We were aboard a military aircraft. The streets of Nukus flew by below; later we saw regularly-shaped fields. Many fields were white: the merciless salt had pushed to the surface. Comfort was at a minimum, with the seats hard and the closeness of the cargo and the large number of people. The passengers next to us were military; they were specialists. An hour would pass until we would arrive at the secret test facility located on the Ustyurt plateau, a facility about which we had heard so many terrible things. We while still in the air were provided with warm cotton large-size trousers and coats. The plateau is a severe place. The temperature in summer rises to 60 degrees Centigrade, but in winter it drops to 60 degrees of frost. And there is wind. Not a single tree, not a bush, nothing but an even rocky surface, like a football field. Weather forecasters predicted that we would run into a fog.

We had already seen quite a bit of fog, as far as that goes. Rumors, rumors, and more rumors. The press—both the local and the central—had been circulating information that tended to be frightening. Something about constructing a new nuclear test facility on the Ustyurt plateau and testing of a neutron bomb supposedly going on. Biological weapons threatening the safety of Karakalpak. Dozens of persons dying of strange causes; sudden outbreaks of a plague; crazed steppe antelopes on the streets of Nukus and Muynak. All kinds of imaginings, even outright accusations. This is levelled at the military, of course; they are testing something in Ustyurt. There have been grounds for alarm. For one thing, Karakalpak until very recently was closed to visits by foreigners.

And so we arrived in Nukus, the capital of the republic. We set out to acquire preliminary information. Was there any truth to the talk of infections, of mass illness of people? An answer to this kind of question is best obtained in a plague control station; there is one in the town. "Ustyurt," explained station chief A. Kenzhebayev, "has always been a natural seat of plague. But nothing out of the ordinary has occurred. There was an occurrence of illnesses in 1968 in Takhtakupyrskiy Rayon; and three cases in 1981 in Bukhara Oblast, which in 1990 suffered a new outbreak of plague. As far as the Ustyurt plateau is concerned, several years ago we denied access to an area that had been declared off limits. But our zoologists go into such places. You could

see an airfield in the distance; a post at intervals of one kilometer held the sign "No Trespassing."

A. Mambetkadirov, physician in charge of the Muynak Rayon Hospital, did not hear anything about people dying of strange causes. Doctor of Biological Sciences Ch. Abdirov, director of the Institute of Clinical and Experimental Medicine, told us that the man is respected and well-known, that he "sees no danger." There were no danger or suspicious phenomena noticed by other residents with whom we spoke: in Nukus, Kungrad, and Muynak.

Well, what would the military have to say about that?

As we found out, the Nukus garrison is directly subordinated to the chief of chemical troops of the CIS Armed Forces. We telephoned the chief of the garrison—Colonel A. Tkachev at that time. Incidentally, he is a doctor of technical sciences. There was a brief pause in the conversation, after which he invited us to "come pay a visit."

Aleksey Yakovlevich Tkachev started out with what lay heavily on our minds:

[Tkachev] Virtually everything they print about us—and I have to say this—is nothing but idle chatter. Figments of the imagination. I wonder why anyone would say something like that. It seems that they wish to stick all of the Aral's troubles on the military. Is it our fault that the sea is drying up, that the earth is being fouled with agricultural fertilizers? The Aral has become a gutter for the area. But what does the military have to do with that?

[TRUD] Where is the truth?

[Tkachev] Let me start by saying that there have been no tests conducted in Ustyurt for two years. And neither chemical nor biological weapons were ever tested here.

[TRUD] Then what was done here?

[Tkachev] What was done was testing of chemical defense means under extreme conditions. Ustyurt is fully suitable for that. In addition, the area is uninhabited and remote. I take advantage of this opportunity to say that our means of protection are more convenient and more habitable than those of the Americans. That, essentially, is all there is to the secrets.

[TRUD] "But, to test means of protection under field conditions, it is most likely necessary to use offensive means, also."

Our conversation partner attempted to be as open as he could on the basis of his instructions:

[Tkachev] Yes, the facility did test bomb mockups charged with slight amounts of sarin, soman, and VX gases. Slight amounts. I say emphatically that this was done in an area isolated and closely guarded. No one could possibly enter. On top of that, the gases used

CIS/RUSSIAN MILITARY ISSUES

evaporate quickly—in two or three days. The testing produced no aftereffects whatsoever; thorough precautions were taken to insure the safety of people and animals. And a special ecological subunit conducted monitoring. Do you harbor any doubt about that? Then consider the following: Located on the range is a military post: Zhaslyk. The military unit is stationed there; families, including children, live there. And, guess what? No one is ill.

[TRUD] What about nuclear weapons?

[Tkachev] I assure you that not a single molecule of radioactive substance was brought here and tested. That can be easily proved.

[TRUD] We of course are grateful for the information you have given us, but we would still like to see the facility, to spend some time in Zhaslyk.

[Tkachev] "I personally cannot give you permission to do so. I hope you understand what I am saying."

Well, there was good reason to be upset. We made a special trip to spend some time in Ustyurt, and now this. We did understand what the garrison chief was trying to tell us: He is military, under orders that must be obeyed. But, anyway... It is one thing to be told something, and another to see for yourself, to make sure.

We fell into some luck. Arriving the following day in Nukus were Colonel General S. Petrov, chief of chemical troops of the CIS Armed Forces, and Major General A. Karyakin, his first deputy. Stanislav Veniaminovich agreed to meet with us, and, not only that, gave us permission to visit the holy of holies: the secret Ustyurt test range.

The plateau rises suddenly and quite prominently. It makes you think of an enormous cobblestone or brick pavement rising up out of the ground. It is a unique natural wonder. Its height is 30 to 40 meters. The raised and jagged edge stretches to the horizon and beyond, as if it were a gigantic wall of a fortress. The surface of Ustyurt is covered with snow, with vehicle tracks easily visible: poachers and smugglers. There is no problem driving a vehicle there; the entire surface is smooth.

So we saw the airfield below us; it was as least as good as the one in Nukus. This, the airstrip of the secret and forbidden zone. We were met by Lieutenant Colonel B. Cheremisin, the commander of the facility safety and security battalion. We climbed aboard a Uaz and headed for the post, which is located only a short distance away. There was actually little to see; our hosts permitted us to look at and photograph everything. There were barracks, dormitories, a greenhouse, in which tomatoes are grown. Also a swimming pool. We saw an unfinished laboratory building and a store. A banner honoring the security company was flying from a flagpole. Standing there was a Russian-Kazakh school. Moms were walking about the buildings with their children as they would in any other settlement.

We made more acquaintances. One was Lyudmila Varakina, who is chief of the local club. Her daughter, five years old, is named Yuliya. Her mom earns 1,500 rubles. Husband Yevgeniy is deputy commander of the military unit.

[Varakina] "We have an apartment. Two rooms. It is very cold here in winter."

"Olga Yakovleva is a teacher," she said, presenting her friend.

[Olga] "I teach children mathematics. My husband Valeriy is a senior lieutenant and serves here. The children suffer kidney trouble; the water is very poor. We get it from the Amu Darya."

"The military authorities took action to help the kids by acquiring cows. The trouble is, the feed has to be trucked in from afar, because feed for bovines cannot grow here."

Well, what will happen to the military post, the test range, if there will be no testing? We took up this topic with Colonel General S. Petrov.

[Petrov] "We are prepared—and have coordinated this with the local authorities—to carry out dust suppression and salt dispersion control throughout the entire republic. A technique for doing that does exist, but it must be refined. Earth cleansing is something else we could do. We possess sufficient scientific forces. For this, means are required, of course. We are willing to save the Aral area as far as our capabilities permit."

We must admit that we left with some feeling of disappointment. We had set out to find some super-secrets, something sensational. Alas! what we did learn was quite mundane: A test range that was shown to journalists; testing that was discontinued a long time ago. But what could be wrong about the Army's becoming a protector of the Aral? Is that not a sensation by itself—the fact that the "man with a gun" is prepared to work on ecological problems, also?

Former Armed Forces Members Interested in Agricultural Sector Work

*924C1318B Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY
in Russian No 16-17, May 92 p 1*

[Unattributed article: "From Barracks to Farms"]

[Text] According to our information, more than 50,000 military personnel released to the reserves this year want to link their future civilian life with the land. Given the creation of the appropriate conditions, they are prepared to become individual farmers or to work in agricultural production.

It is interesting that, having been accustomed to collectivism, 95 percent of this contingent want to locate their farms close together—in groups of 20-30 farms each. The

rest, evidently having machine guns just in case, are prepared to go to separate individual farms.

Of those who are being released, 8 percent will go to Siberia and the Far East, 16 percent to western and southwestern Russia, 20 percent to the south, and 40 percent to the central regions.

And so, before it is too late, small and large executives in the CIS can lure intelligent, educated and disciplined workers with families to their farms by guaranteeing them elementary living conditions. One has to assume that bachelors might be interested by the young girls, who find it rather difficult to farm alone. In order to take advantage of this opportunity for oneself, one may write the Committee for the Social Security of Military Personnel at the address: Russia, 125832, Moscow, Shchepkin Street, 42.

In order to make it easier to get oriented, it might be added that 50 percent of the military personnel would like to till the land, 25 percent—to raise livestock, 12 percent—to raise poultry, and 7 percent—to keep bees.

CIS: POLICY

Reasons for Prohibition of Military Commercial Activity

92UM0942A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
17 Apr 92 First Edition p 2

[Article by Captain 2d Rank B. Gromak, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent: "Scandalous Affairs: Businessmen in Epaulets At Times Break the Law"]

[Text] As has already been announced by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, from now on commercial activities have been prohibited in the Armed Forces. In particular the ideas found in the article by our correspondent help to show why such a decision was taken.

The story involving the export transloading of oil and oil products through the main base of the Baltic Fleet in Kaliningrad Oblast has reverberated widely. On 12 March, the fleet newspaper STRAZH BALTIKI published an article by the Chairman of the Baltiysk City Soviet, Captain 2d Rank B. Dovydienko entitled "The Petrodollar Is Not a Comrade for the City. Could It Be the Sir." On the following day the newspaper YANTARNYY KRAY devoted an entire column to this story, having entitled it "The Admiral Dreamt in Color: Blue Sea, Black Oil and Green Dollars..."

In brief on the crux of the matter. On 20 February, in Moscow the Company TS or Scandinavian Trading Company Aktsiebulag [transliteration], the Command of the Baltic Fleet, the International Center for Business Collaboration, the Fund for the Social Development of Russia—"Vozrozhdeniye", and the Russian Fund for Navy Traditions and Relics, "Morskoy Kumpantsvo", signed a contract on establishing a joint enterprise. The

basic task of the enterprise was to be the export transhipping of oil via the closed port of Baltiysk.

I have seen a copy of this contract. It is rather extensive, and for this reason, as a military man, I shall voice my ideas on the role of the Baltic Fleet in this undertaking. The Fleet Command, as its share, is to contribute, as follows from the contract, the right to use a plot of land (approximately 47 hectares in the region of the town Baltiysk-Svetlyy.—V.G.) and the adjacent waters... the existing infrastructure facilities, the right to use water and other resources located on the territory where the future terminal is to be located.

If one examines the RSFSR Land Code and the Water Code, it is immediately apparent that this provision does not conform with the documents as here the Fleet is taking over for the state bodies. Also violated is the Decree of the Russian Supreme Soviet according to which the hydraulic engineering facilities are to be considered federal property. The point in the contract on force majeure is also not clear to me. The Baltic Fleet Command can use the facilities and territory of the SP [joint enterprise] with the occurrence of extraordinary circumstances (the declaring of a state of emergency, natural disasters, the carrying out of other missions of state importance by the Fleet) only for a period that the force majeure circumstances are in effect, but for not more than six months running. That is, the Fleet ceases to be the master of the piers and land essential for it in carrying out its tasks, even in instances of an emergency situation, if this should last over 6 months. From the document it is also not clear what precisely is to be gained by the Fleet from all this pumping of oil.

The situation was not clarified by my conversation with one of those whose signature was on the contract, the Commander of the Baltic Fleet, Admiral V. Yegorov. It would be hard to say what the reason was for this. But we cannot exclude the fact that Vladimir Grigoryevich [Yegorov] was strictly following the point of the contract: "The time and contents of all public announcements concerning the founding and current activities of the joint enterprises are important factors for the success of the joint enterprise. For this reason, in excluding instances when this is required for obtaining the appropriate government permissions, none of the participants should reveal the contents of the current contract without the agreement of the other participants... All public announcement concerning the joint enterprise and its operations should be made by the director general."

In truth, someone at the Fleet Staff made the proposal that Dovydienko had initiated a law suit against the Fleet in order to gain an advantage for himself and to drive the Baltic Fleet out of Baltiysk. But Dovydienko states something else: Admiral. V. Yegorov did not have any legal right to offer the land plot and the structures which the Fleet does not own. According to the law, in the event that these are used improperly, the right to use them can

be lost. For this reason they try to carry out their deals in deep secrecy from the local authorities behind the screen of the military department.

Who here is right, who in the wrong? Clearly I do not have the competence to answer. But this story reaffirms the notion which I have voiced already in several articles. This is that the Baltic Fleet is showing the dangerous extension of the actual wholesale and retail selling of various military property which the Fleet does not own and which, as federal property, can only be sold upon a decision of the Russian Federation Government. Often, in carrying out such deals, due to the incompetence of the officials and the military command bodies of the Baltic Fleet, both domestic and foreign structures, in concluding contracts with the troop units, stipulated one-sided advantages for themselves. In this manner the Fleet is put in a knowingly disadvantageous situation. This subsequently leads to losses.

I am not inclined to blame the new Command of the Baltic Fleet here, for this tradition was established long before it. For example, on 5 August of last year, the Baltic Fleet in the person of its Commander, Admiral V. Ivanov and the Feori Firm [which], in the person of its director N. Grishina, concluded a contract on collaboration in the sphere of developing maritime transport, maritime transport services, ship repairs, the breaking up and sale of scrap metal, construction work as well as the training and retraining of personnel. As later became clear, this was done under punitive conditions for the Fleet. Admiral Ivanov, in evolving this contract, concluded an agreement which was clearly not beneficial to the Fleet on the transhipping of oil products belonging to Feori through the oil terminal at the military harbor in Baltiysk.

During 1987-1991, the Fleet made it a practice to sell written-off and sunken ships overseas by concluding contracts with joint enterprises, as has already been described by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in the article "They Figured It Up and Then Shed a Tear." The article was disregarded in the Fleet, and for this reason I was forced to give another several additional facts. The former First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Baltic Fleet, Rear-Admiral A. Rudometkin and the former Chief of the Fleet Rear Services, Vice-Admiral I. Ryabinin ordered the Chief of the Riga Naval Garrison in November 1990-April 1991, to turn over four submarines for scrapping to Latvchermet [Latvian Ferrous Metals Administration]. All this was covered in a bill for the delivery of scrap metal by the fleet. The immediate executor of the operation was Captain 1st Rank V. Shemchuk. All four subs were delivered by him to SP Ferrum which was operating under the Latvian State Production Association Vtorchermet [Secondary Ferrous Metals]. The Director of the SP, L. Sidorov issued a paper from which it followed that the two subs delivered as ship scrap were entered in the plan for the delivery of scrap metal by the fleet. But if one looks at the by-laws of Ferrum, then from these we would quote: The SP does not have the right to accept planned deliveries of scrap

metal. The subs delivered by the Fleet went for quite different purposes, as Ferrum through SP Purbalt, sold two submarines to Finland and another two to an Estonian-Finnish Stock Society Hamiscrap. All the conversion work here was carried out by personnel from the ship security brigade in the Fleet's water area.

Captain 1st Rank V. Shemchuk explained this "oversight" rather simply: "I considered SP Ferrum to be a subdivision of Latvian Vtorchermet and assumed that I was acting accordingly, since there were no comments from the Baltic Fleet OFI [Financial Department] and to which I had sent copies of the aforementioned documents.

Ferrum and Purbalt received foreign exchange for the sale of the subs.

At approximately the same time, with the aid of the Commandant of the Tallinn Garrison, Captain 2d Rank Yu. Sinin, the Stock Company Hamiscrap received five submarines which had been earmarked for planned scraping at Estonvtorchermet [Estonian Secondary Ferrous Metal Association]. As I was informed at the appropriate agencies, the total loss from the above indicated operation was \$716,200. I am not speaking here of those numerous illegal deals by businessmen in epaulets which have been caught by the military procuracy workers. For example, the attempt of Captain 1st Rank V. Zubrik to deliver to the Adrese Firm a large amount of nonferrous metal at clearly understated prices. Or the attempt to sell the 77th Ship Repair Yard and the Mayori Sanitorium. Extremely frivolous (if this word can be applied) actions were involved in the deal made by Captain 1st Rank I. Lasotskiy with the Parsani Stock Company in Tallinn. Under the guise of military freight, 35 tanks cars with diesel fuel were illegally delivered from Russia. The company then sold the fuel at speculative prices. A bit fewer, 28 cars, also in the form of military freight, were illegally brought in from the Russian Federation in January of this year by Captain 2d Rank B. Kondrashov. The owner of the fuel was the Alvi stock company (Tallinn) which sold the fuel at commercial prices. Captain 2d Rank V. Khomutinin, in the interests of Estonian commercial structures organized the smuggling of nonferrous metals from St. Petersburg. One of the dispatchers of the freight was a Leningrad Military District troop unit which had been disbanded... seven years ago.

Recently the Baltic Fleet Procurator's Office recognized one other deal as illegal between the wholesale-retail association under the Baltic Fleet Trade Directorate, the Geya-Balt Firm and the Korvet Society and the Svetlogorsk Gorispolkom. The setting up of a society with limited liability, the Korvet Trade Firm, also caused a large amount of losses for the Fleet, up to the point of the loss of the right of the trade directorate to possess property.

It would be possible to give other examples of the unsuccessful and at times criminally negligent activities

of the businessmen from the Baltic Fleet. The state of affairs has not been improved either by the setting up in the Fleet of a Coordinating Center headed by Read-Admiral V. Bobrovskiy. The deals are continuing and the Fleet continues to suffer losses.

What is the way out of this? In my view, the time has come for a detailed audit of the entrepreneurial structures set up by military administrative agencies and troop units. Since the troops and naval forces are under the jurisdiction of Russia, then clearly the need has arisen to have a Presidential decree with clear instructions as to who is to dispose of the decommissioned and about to be decommissioned military equipment and how this is to be done. It should be precisely in the interests of the state, the Fleet and the Armed Forces and not those various commercial structures which are extracting fabulous gain.

CIS: STRATEGIC DETERRENT FORCES

'Military Expert' on Statistical Danger of Nuclear Weapons Accident

924P0124A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY
in Russian No 15, Apr 92 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Speaking Unofficially About Official Matters—Missiles Are 'Kicking up Dust' on the Roads"]

[Text] In the opinion of military expert P.G. Belov, the probability of an accident with an individual nuclear warhead is one in 10 million each year. If we consider that we have more than 30,000 warheads, and they have been in service for more than 30 years, then this ratio will be 1 in 100.

The most dangerous types of armaments for our population are the PS-22 and PS-12M mobile-based missiles. The housing of such missiles contains a nuclear charge, conventional explosives, self-igniting toxic substances, and chemical sources of electrical current. This "assortment" does not, unfortunately, remain in one place; they are "kicking up dust" along our highways and railroads.

Ten instances have been recorded where such missiles have tipped over. There were plenty of preconditions for an explosion—a hot engine, spilled fuel, a short circuit, and fire. Moreover, there is nothing with which to extinguish it; only two fire extinguishers on the carriage were put in use. And in case of fire personnel are supposed to remove themselves to a distance of 600 meters. That is according to the written instructions...

Here is an interesting detail. During the talks on reduction of nuclear weapons the Americans did not insist on elimination of these missiles. Perhaps this was because they are much more dangerous to us than to the Americans and their allies.

CIS: GROUND TROOPS

Armenian Missile Brigade Urges Solution to Withdrawal Problem

92UM0925A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
18 Apr 92 p 5

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Colonel O. Falichev, Stepanavan—Gyumri—Moscow: "Hostages... Has the Status of the CIS Allied Armed Forces Troops in the Transcaucasus Been Defined After the Transfer to Russian Jurisdiction?"]

[Text] The Moloch [God] of War in the Transcaucasus is implacable. The number of victims is already in the hundreds. Quite a few of them have been servicemen. Having found themselves at the whim of fate between the hostile parties, having been counted among the occupiers with the disintegration of the Union, they are still performing their military duty. However, there are increasingly fewer who are willing risk their lives for what they don't know and don't understand. People are tired of the lack of legal and social protection and the uncertainty of their future. Evidence of that is the recent event at the rocket unit which Colonel G. Kulikov commands. The situation has turned out to be untenable...

From a 7th Army Missile Brigade Officers Assembly Appeal to the Russian Federation President and to the CIS Allied Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief:

Having discussed the missions assigned to the brigade, the Officers Assembly thinks that the CIS General Staff directive on the redeployment and future disbanding of the brigade does not consider the actual military-political situation in Armenia since it has come into contradiction with the Republic of Armenia Supreme Soviet Decree of 12 March 1992... which places under threat the lives, personal dignity and social protection of brigade officers and their family members. We demand... that the issue on the withdrawal of arms and equipment be coordinated with the President of the Republic of Armenia and be carried out under the supervision of their representatives. First of all, resolve the problem of the withdrawal of families and personal property. In the event of nonfulfillment of the demands, the Officers Assembly retains the right to make an independent decision in accordance with the situation that is taking shape in the region.

24 March 1992.

Just what has occurred? Why have brigade officers expressed themselves in such a sharp and almost categorical manner? Obviously, we do not need to explain what the situation is today in the Transcaucasus. Although at times you begin to think: Not all of us fully comprehend that a very real war is occurring there where they are killing, raping, torturing, and taking hostages... Our troops, in whom we have instilled the need to remain neutral, have been left on the edge in it for a long time and they do not have the right to stand up for

themselves. Right now this uncertainty is behind. They can already protect the property and vehicles entrusted to them and the honor and dignity of their dear ones with weapons in hand. But this frequently enters into contradiction with local procedures and the new political realities. For the sake of what, ask the officers, must they risk their lives and the safety of their families? Where are the guarantees that the law is on their side? Finally, whose interests are they defending on that soil and for the sake of which ideals? It is difficult to answer these questions, particularly with regard to ideals. To say the least, they will consider an officer a strange person if he talks about defending Russia's national interests in the Transcaucasus. The material rewards? You can hardly seriously talk about it even in comparison with the daily salary of any successful cooperator. Who will answer: for the sake of what is he there, our officer, in the mud and blood, cold and hunger?

In the missile brigade which we are discussing, people have lived for years under conditions of heightened combat readiness, while spending day and night in flak jackets. Combat operations are not being conducted here but a week does not go by when the military garrison does come under fire or when an attack has been conducted for the purpose of seizing vehicles. The local guerrillas (Fedayeen) have practically all of the equipment on their books. Any redeployment or movement of equipment causes dissatisfaction and retaliatory actions. Here recently a Ural gasoline truck, which had been subjected to an armed attack, did not return to the unit. Prior to this, they had hijacked three vehicles. And the commander of an allied detachment of Fedayeen warned Colonel Yu. Poluektov, commander of a neighboring unit, "in a gentlemanly fashion": "Your depots are under the protection of my assault weapons."

You will agree that it is far from pleasant to serve under this, putting it mildly, guardianship. And more accurately—under the very strict control of everything that is occurring in the CIS Allied Armed Forces units and subunits that are deployed here. At Gyumri Airport (Leninakan), through which you reach the missile brigade, for example, the Fedayeen have long since "grounded" the entire squadron of military helicopters. The pilots languish without anything to do and are losing their skills. But no one can do anything: if they attempt to remove the aircraft—they will lose people. "It is good that we at least managed to withdraw the nuclear combat units from the Transcaucasus," I heard from Colonel Kulikov, with a sigh of relief. "Otherwise..."

Matters with the resolution of everyday problems are no better for the missileers. Sometimes you do not receive your salary for two months. There is neither hot water nor gas in their homes. The children are practically not being taught since they go to school once a week. And when they have returned, they have teary eyes from the smoke of the solar oil that heats the stoves...

It would seem to be simplest of all in this situation to ship out the families and personal effects to relatives. But how? Several officers have attempted to do this...

"In order to get a container, you need to pay a 5,000 ruble bribe," says 7th Army Missile and Artillery Troops Commander Colonel N. Bushmanov. "However, even in this case, the railroad is not providing any guarantees for the safety of the cargo. Those containers which we somehow manage to ship are subject to being looted."

There is the same problem with airplane tickets—the only form of transportation under conditions of a blockade of railroads and automobile roads. And if you have need? "In order to ship a coffin with the body of an officer who was killed, the local Mafia requested a R5,000 bribe," Senior Lieutenant I. Myslun told me with sadness and despair. "It turns out that when you serve for a plug nickel under fire,—it is necessary. But if you are killed..."

All of this has gradually filled our cup of patience to overflowing. The General Staff directive on the withdrawal and disbandment of the brigade that was published practically simultaneously with the Republic of Armenia Supreme Soviet Decree "On Increasing Requirements for the State of Preservation of Military Equipment That Has Been Secured by Military Units Deployed on the Territory of the Republic of Armenia" was like the last drop. It unequivocally stated a ban on the shipment of military equipment from military units or its movement without the concurrence of the Armenian authorities. "Individuals who have violated this," it stressed, "will be charged to the fullest extent of the law." It would seem, they will not manage to withdraw the unit without bloodshed. But to withdraw with engagements and losses like the 366th Regiment—that prospect suits few people in the brigade. So, despite the definite categorical nature of the appeal, its appearance was, obviously, the only solution from the situation that has developed.

We need to say that they reacted rapidly and properly to the situation at the General Staff, at the CIS Allied Armed Forces General Purpose Forces Main Staff, and at the All-Army Officers Assembly Coordinating Council where the missileers appeal arrived. The time periods for disbandment of the missile brigade were determined for a later date through a decision of the CIS Allied Armed Forces General Staff. Which generally suited the officers and their families.

Personnel, financial, and other issues associated with the withdrawal of personal property, and the future assignments of officers or their release into the reserve have been worked out. CIS Allied Armed Forces Missile Troops and General Purpose Forces Artillery Commander Colonel-General N. Dimidyuk, other generals, and officers representing the General Staff, the All-Army Officers Assembly Coordinating Council Presidium, and personnel organs have already flown to the site with the prepared decisions. The very fact of the arrival of such

an authoritative, empowered group had a philanthropic impact on people's moods. The missileers learned about the new time periods for the withdrawal of the brigade and assignments, and could express what bothered them most. This eliminated tension. And yet many of the questions have remained, as they say, open. What is the status of our troops that are deployed in the Transcaucasus? Has it been determined? Has it been coordinated with the government of the independent states? Finally, what are the guarantees and rights of servicemen after the transfer of the Transcaucasus Military District to Russian jurisdiction?

To be sure, this was a long-awaited political act for all of the soldiers. But in practice, we need to admit that it has changed little in the daily lives and service of the officers and their families. How they were and have remained defenseless before local "procedures" and the lack of legal limits. How both before and now they could simply take an officer, his wife and child hostage and blackmail and threaten. "And right now, after the Decree, one can hear addressed at us: 'occupiers'" says Transcaucasus Military District Command Staff Officer Colonel M. Yershov. "Servicemen who are assigned here still do not have any precise legal guarantees. But without them... On New Year's Day, they killed one of our senior officers, a professor of the former Tbilisi Higher Artillery Command School. But no one has borne responsibility for that..." We can add that, according to information of the military district deputy military procurator, the military district procuracy has discovered nearly 60 cases of attacks against servicemen in 1990-1991 in Armenia alone. But the guilty parties have been brought to justice in only two of them.

It turns out that little happens if they take the troops under their jurisdiction. Their status must be determined and the conditions of their stay in the sovereign states of the Transcaucasus region, the responsibility of individual citizens and countries for damage to the Armed Forces must be grounded and reinforced by appropriate inter-state agreements. And this, it goes without saying, is the concern of the politicians and leaders of the state.

Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Kozyrev recently met with the leaders of the Transcaucasus republics. Military personnel pinned a great deal of hope on this meeting.

"Unfortunately, for now we cannot say that a radical decision, which will eliminate the substantial problems in the near future, occurred on key problems," General Staff Representative Major-General B. Raznikov told me. "But it is unambiguous: if it does not appear, then the uncertainty, chaos, and the absence of rights will remain, despite all the efforts of the CIS Allied Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief's directorate, the General Staff, and the General Purpose Forces Main Staff. Judge for yourself: in order to withdraw even containers with the household goods of officers by military echelon requires, I stress, a political decision..."

Analysis of the military-political situation in the Transcaucasus suggests that we should obviously not wait for simple or rapid agreements. Rather, each of the republics here will draw the "army blanket" to itself. Two of them have already stated that they will create their own armed forces. Therefore, the question arises: do we really need to maintain troops in sovereign states whose governments still cannot guarantee their legal protection?

CIS Allied Armed Forces Chief of the General Staff Colonel-General V. Samsonov stated in a recent interview that "there are many grounds for withdrawal." That is also what Transcaucasus Military District Commander Colonel-General V. Patrikeyev thinks, although he has his own point of view on this. But if you raise the question decisively, then you need to admit: today the military district's existence is largely problematical. The bitter example with the attempt to withdraw the 366th Motorized Rifle Regiment is confirmation of that. The missile brigade which I am writing about is in no better position. I am not revealing a secret if I say that it has long since been combat ready. There are several reasons for this but one of the primary ones is the shortage of personnel. CIS Allied Armed Forces Missile Troops and General Purpose Forces Artillery Commander Colonel-General N. Dimidyuk has unambiguously stated on this score: "Why is that missile unit, whose manning is lower than 50 percent, needed here. Moreover, the situation is similar in nearly all Transcaucasus Military District missile units."

The contract system of service that has not proven itself in the Transcaucasus compels us to ponder many things. For example, in the autumn, of the 18,000 conscripts needed by the military district, only 1,500 men agreed to sign a contract. The spring draft has even fewer chances of success. The "lack of rights situation for servicemen in the Transcaucasus republics" and the need to withdraw personnel of Slavic nationalities from "hot spots" was announced at the soldiers' mothers rally that occurred in Krasnodar on March 31. What kind of combat training and combat readiness can we talk about in this case?

What is the solution? Competent individuals must seek it. But for now...

"But for now, all of us here are—political hostages," Deputy Unit Commander for Personnel Lieutenant Colonel S. Khachaturov said bitterly.

While driving away from Gyumri (Leninakan), I recalled that already three years ago this and other cities of Armenia lay in ruins after the terrible earthquake. I saw how, while risking their lives, military personnel were the first to offer aid to local residents. How they extracted victims from beneath the ruins...Many officers and warrant officers lost dear ones and relatives at that time. Having survived all of that, having remained alive after Afghanistan, and... to become hostages and "occupiers"—is an unenviable fate. I think that our soldiers deserved something else, a more respectful attitude toward them. Despite everything, despite all of the troubles and misfortunes that have befallen us, they now represent a great state—Russia.

Baku Regiment Demands Withdrawal, Safety of Servicemen

*92UM0984A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 30 Apr 92 p 3*

[Article by Aleksandr Shanko: "Officers to Go for Break-through"]

[Text] The editorial office was visited yesterday by two officers from the 135th Regiment of the Baku Division. One is Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir G., the other, Major Andrey Ye. They were in Moscow on a mission for an officer assembly of Military Unit No 39486. (The names of the officers are known to the editors, but they are not being disclosed, to protect the officers' families.) The purpose of the servicemen's visit to the capital of Russia was to hand an appeal by the unit officer assembly to President Yeltsin, CIS Unified Armed Forces Commander Shaposhnikov, and the officer assembly's coordinating council.

On 10 May 1991, the 135th Regiment was ordered to leave Baku, to form a buffer zone on the Armenia-Azerbaijan border on the line Lachin-Kubatly-Zangilan. The regiment upon arriving at its destination initiated its mission, which was to protect Azerbaijani settlements from attack by armed Armenian units. Action was also taken to counter raids being made by Azerbaijanis against the Armenian side.

In the end of January and the beginning of February of 1992, Azerbaijanis started to launch attacks on elements of the regiment. And so, during the night, the weapons were removed from the post at Kubatly, where regimental headquarters were located. Mekhtiyev, the then Azerbaijan minister of defense, promised to find the culprits and return the weapons. The culprits were not found. Some of the weapons were returned. Subsequently, subunits of Azerbaijan territorial self-defense battalions were stationed at the gates of the 135th Regiment to prevent the withdrawal of military equipment.

In March, Marshal Shaposhnikov issued an order for the troops to leave the Armenian-Azerbaijani border. The regiment was to start its march to Baku on 10 March, but an order calling for this was never issued. The 135th Regiment was left to its own fate, according to what the officers said. Consequently, the regiment decided to make the withdrawal on its own volition.

As a result of a blockade of the roads set up by Azerbaijanis (with women and children participating in picketing, the way blocked by vehicles, and attempts made to provoke the soldiers into firing their weapons), the regiment suffered the following losses: 300 automatic rifles; 9 82-mm mortars; 51 grenade launchers; 89 machineguns; 75 large-caliber machineguns, 33 sniper rifles; 500 grenades; tens of thousands of rounds of ammunition; 49 trucks; and 81 armored vehicles (BTRs, BRDMs). The regiment however arrived at Baku without having suffered human casualties.

The officers said that in the Azerbaijan capital there are continuing attempts to take weapons belonging to the Baku Division. Pay has not been disbursed to commissioned and enlisted personnel. The Azerbaijan Ministry of Defense is encouraging desertion. Motor vehicles and food supplies are being plundered. Since the beginning of 1992, there have been stolen and not returned 91 vehicles; 134 items of armored equipment, including tanks; and 116 small arms items (not counting pieces belonging to the 135th Regiment).

The officer assembly of the Baku Division feels that the existing situation renders the division incapable of fulfilling its mission, and does hereby appeal to President of Russia Yeltsin, Azerbaijan Acting President Mamedov, Commander Shaposhnikov, Transcaucasus Military District Commander Patrikeyev, and the officer assembly coordinating council to resolve, by 10 May, a number of problems, which include: relocating the unit's personnel and dependents of the servicemen from Azerbaijan to Russian soil; for the leadership of Azerbaijan to insure the safety of the division's men and their dependents; for Commander Shaposhnikov to discharge requesting officers into the reserves in line with the manpower reduction; and for Commander Patrikeyev to rectify the pay situation.

The officer assembly appeal contains the following statement: "If these problems are not resolved by 1 June 1992, we reserve the right to decide our own fate, with the blame for the consequences to fall upon the government of Russia and Azerbaijan and the leadership of the CIS Forces."

"The division's officers intend to personally climb into the drivers's seats of the combat vehicles," said the lieutenant and the major during their visit to NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, "and they will head for a breakthrough and then toward Russia, in the direction of Makhachkaly."

CIS: NAVAL FORCES**Kapitanets: Historical Value of Russian Navy**

*92UM0961A Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK
in Russian No 2, Feb 1992 (Signed to press 02 Mar 92)
pp 3-13*

[Article by Fleet Adm I. Kapitanets, first deputy commander of the Navy, under the rubric "The Times and the Navy": "To Serve the Homeland"]

[Text] The regular Russian navy will be 300 years old in the fall of 1996. The three centuries alone would seem to be irrefutable proof that the navy was vitally essential to our nation. In both the recent and the distant past a number of statesmen and public figures have cast doubt upon this obvious fact, however.

One does not have to try hard for arguments against outlays on the development and maintenance of the

navy today. The extremely difficult state of our economy, the collapse of the political system and the very acute crisis with the state structure seem to have robbed those who advocate preserving the state's naval power of the last opportunity to be understood. It therefore seems necessary mentally to go over our navy's dramatic path once again and attempt to explain an apparently paradoxical phenomenon, the denial of the navy's role in a nation whose economic development depends so greatly upon its participation in the international division of labor, which, in turn, requires access to the World Ocean.

I believe that the denial of the navy's role is primarily a result of a superficial understanding of our history and the way the upcoming generation needs to be brought up, as a result of which the concept some of our citizens have of national interests is distorted or very underdeveloped.

The economic axis of Kievan Rus, however, the basis for its prosperity was the "route from the Varangians to the Greeks." The Tatar-Mongolian invasion and the loss of access to the shores of the Black and Baltic seas along with the Horde's plunder was the main cause of the Moscow state's profound backwardness. It was only natural that traffic to the sea—first to the Caspian and then the Baltic—was renewed as soon as the state grew stronger.

And while the movement of the Russians to the east, and specifically the conquest of Kazan and Astrakhan, did not worry the European states at that time, attempts by the Russian czars to strengthen their influence in Europe evoked stiff resistance from neighbors, who wanted to preserve the enormous benefits stemming from their "intermediation" between the West and Moscow.

A study of the naval history of Rus prior to Peter shows that in one way or another the rulers of all the West European states without exception opposed our state's establishment of a presence on marine shores. This was a priority mission for Sweden, the Hanseatic League, Poland and Denmark for hundreds of years. An attempt by the Swedes to capture the mouth of the Neva caused the famous Battle of Neva back in 1240. During the 14th through 17th centuries they and the Livonian Order, with the support of other Baltic states, jointly kept all outlets to this sea closed to Russia in a determined and prolonged struggle.

Neither the immediate nor the distant neighbors of the Russian state were in a condition to prevent the inevitable development of objective historical processes, however. Peter the Great was the first of the Russian sovereigns to understand that the problem of acquiring access to the seas would not be solved for the state without access to advanced European science. He was the one who formulated the extremely doctrinal principle—which has still not lost its significance—that victory can be achieved in an armed struggle only through the joint efforts of various branches of armed forces, or, in Peter's

words: "Any potentate who has only a ground army has only one arm, but he who has also a navy has two arms...."

It took an enormous effort for the Russians to build a modern navy at that time. The building of a navy became even more difficult as the 17th century ended and the 18th began. From the standpoint of its technical outfitting, it was the most difficult branch of the armed forces. This can be illustrated with a single example. The Russian army had only 72 guns in the Battle of Poltava, while the Poltava, the Baltic Fleet's first battleship, had 54 guns—that is, only 18 fewer than the entire army. A few years later, however, there were several such battleships in the fleet, and they were more powerfully armed.

A large number of interrelated problems had to be solved in order to build the navy: considerably increasing the output of those industrial branches which operated for the navy, building the slips, setting up the construction of ships measuring up to the demands of that period, providing them with basing facilities, setting up the agencies of command and control, and teaching the navy how to fight. And in order to accomplish any of these tasks the appropriate specialists first had to be trained. This was all accomplished within an extremely brief period of time in history, 2 decades, which should without exaggeration be regarded as a feat by our people.

The Russian fleet underwent its first combat christening at the walls of Azov, where it graphically demonstrated its effectiveness. Russia then shifted its efforts to the Baltic. During the Northern War (1700-1721) it was forced to fight mainly on land. In 1709 a struggle erupted in the maritime theater of combat operations, where the Russian fleet once again proved that it was essential and demonstrated its strength in a confrontation with a battle-hardened Swedish fleet, and—this was especially valuable—the state's military-political leadership acquired considerably greater possibilities for selecting the strategy and tactics for combatting the enemy which measured up most completely to the developing situation.

The Baltic Fleet's power was the crucial factor in the victory and a barrier to the formation of a strong anti-Russian coalition during the final years of the war. Russia finally acquired the access to the sea it so greatly needed. It also received the old Baltic ports of Riga and Revel. The very largest territorial acquisitions on land could not have contributed as much to the nation's development as that strip of coastline on the gulfs of Finland and Riga. This outcome of the war was achieved in great part due to the fleet. Its significance for Russia was not limited to the performance of the immediate military functions. The need for a fleet was also a stimulus to the development of various sectors of the economy (the timber industry, metallurgy, the textile industry), science (mathematics, physics, astronomy,

geography) and the educational system. The sailors, in turn, were already contributing greatly to the development of both our national science and world science with their participation in expeditions, geographic discoveries and research in the most diverse fields in the 18th and the first half of the 19th century.

At the end of the 1720s, however, the fleet went into a decline. The immediate successors to Peter I were drawn into a power struggle. The empire's foreign political activity declined. Construction rates for the fleet were reduced drastically, and allocations for this went "into arrears." For economic reasons the Supreme Privy Council adopted a decision in 1728 "to maintain the ships and frigates in a state in which they can immediately be armed for a campaign, should the need arise: to wait with the procurement of provisions and other supplies necessary for a campaign...."¹ This was detected immediately by the neighbors, and the British, together with the allied Danish navy, staged a hostile demonstration near Revel in 1726.

The fleet did take an active part in the Russo-Turkish (1735-1739), Russo-Swedish (1741-1743) and Seven Year (1756-1763) wars, however, and, despite the fact that they occurred at a time of relative decline for the navy, it contributed to a conclusion of these wars which constituted a success for Russia.

The rebirth of our country's naval power began in the 1760s, when Empress Katherine II renewed the struggle for access to the Black Sea. The Russo-Turkish War of 1768-1774 was more than just a new stage in the growth of Russia's naval power. For the first time in our history the navy performed an independent strategic mission, opening up a new front on the Aegean Sea and actually severing naval communication lines linking the Turkish metropolis with its rich Lebanese and North African provinces.

The Turkish army's rout in the Black Sea area and our fleet's skillful actions in the archipelago led to the successful conclusion of the war. Russia acquired an outlet to the Black Sea, where the building of a navy began.

The European capitals recognized the significance of this. And when a new war between Russia and Turkey began in 1787, the governments of the great powers did everything possible to prevent the Russian squadron from entering the Mediterranean Sea. The fleet's successes in the Black Sea helped us achieve victory in the Russo-Turkish War of 1787-1791, however, which established Russia's position as a Black Sea power.

The war with Sweden began in the Baltic simultaneously with the Russo-Turkish War. There was a threat to Petersburg itself, in the area of which the Swedes intended to set a landing force ashore. Baltic ships played a crucial role also in this war.

The existence of a powerful navy was one of the factors enabling the government to conduct a vigorous foreign

policy at that time. Prior to the war of independence of the North American colonies, for example, Russia resolutely opposed restricting freedom of maritime trade for neutral nations, a policy actively pursued by England. Three squadrons sent to sea ensured observance of the Declaration on Armed Neutrality promulgated by the Russian government.

The end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th centuries was a time of difficult trials for the Russian armed forces. Russia engaged in almost continuous wars independently or as a member of coalitions with France (1798-1800 and 1805-1807), Turkey (1806-1812) and Sweden (1808-1809). The Russian navy continued to be an extremely important strategic factor in all the main European theaters of military operations.

A skeptical attitude toward the navy prevailed in Russian government circles at the beginning of the 19th century. Russian diplomats failed to take proper advantage of the victory in the Mediterranean Sea. During the Russo-Swedish War the fleet was unable to exhibit its former activeness. Little use was made of the Baltic Fleet during the Patriotic War of 1812 and the Russian army's foreign campaign of 1813-1814. It operated on the army's naval flank. Here is another interesting fact. Count Vorontsov, appointed by Alexander I as chairman of the Committee for the Development of a Navy, wrote the following: "For many reasons, physical and local, Russia cannot be among the preeminent naval powers. Our immediate power and strength must be in ground forces...."² Admiral Chichagov and then the Marquis de Traverse, a French emigrant, joined the committee during that period. Both of them shared the conviction of Vorontsov and of Alexander I himself, who did not understand the "state significance of the fleet for Russia."

Attention to the navy did not begin to grow again until the end of the 1820s. A buildup of its facilities began, and its battle-worthiness started to improve. This was graphically demonstrated in the Russo-Turkish War of 1827-1828 and the beginning of the Crimean War of 1853-1856, when a Black Sea squadron destroyed a Turkish Fleet in the Bay of Sinop.

This was the last battle of the era of the sailing fleet, however. Its period of greatest flowering turned into a decline. Sails were replaced by steam. Steamships, which evoked derision in backers of the sailing fleet with their clumsy appearance and soot in their early years, rapidly improved. Russia, with its backward political system and undeveloped industry, was not prepared for this qualitative leap. As a result, when the Anglo-French fleet, consisting mainly of steamships, entered the Black Sea, our fleet was not capable of countering it. The enemy landed in the Crimea and approached Sevastopol. A Black Sea squadron was scuttled at the entrance to the bay to bar the enemy fleet from the roadstead.

The Sevastopol epic evoked a growth of patriotism in Russia and won the respect of the world community.

There are few instances in history in which the defeated were more delighted than the victors. Significantly, Russia's territorial losses in that war were relatively small. The ban on any sort of significant Russian naval fleet in the Black Sea was the most important thing from the standpoint of the allied governments of England, France and Turkey. The Russian autocracy was most affected by the Baltic Fleet's virtual inability to protect the capital, which enabled an enemy squadron to invade the Gulf of Finland with impunity and threaten Petersburg. Following the Crimean War Russia's government ignored the costs and attempted to restore the fleet to a level, if not to equal the other great naval powers, at least to be able to counter them. Despite the widespread image of czarism's stagnation, statesmen of the times vigilantly followed all innovations in naval weaponry and even tried to eliminate the lag in certain areas. At that time there began to develop those views on the fleet's operational-strategic employment which predetermined its development and training essentially up to the beginning of the 20th century. Even basically correct views and intelligent decisions could not be fully implemented, however. The experience with the restoration of Russia's naval strength following the Crimean War deserves the closest of attention and continuous study, however.

First of all the strategic objectives of the empire's foreign policy were defined for many years into the future, after which the experience with the Crimean and other naval wars was thoroughly studied and assumptions were drawn on the nature of a future war at sea. The state's limited financial and economic possibilities were also weighed fairly soberly. All of this made it possible to define the navy's most urgent missions. With respect to the Baltic, this mainly involved defending the capital. At the same time a search was launched for active methods for combatting the fleets of likely enemies. To seek a traditional general engagement with them was tantamount to suicide.

The idea of threatening the enemy's naval communication lines was born, because the economic and military strength of the great European powers of the time was based on their exploitation of the resources of numerous colonies and on a vast maritime trade. At the beginning of the 1860s, along with the intensive construction of armored coastal defense ships (armored batteries, monitors and armored boats), Russia also built frigates without armor, converted clippers purchased abroad into long-range steam-driven/screw-propeller vessels capable of operating in remote regions of the oceans and preventing enemy naval traffic.

The czarist government demonstrated the capabilities of the restored navy in 1863. England and France attempted to exploit the uprising which had flared up in Poland as a pretext for a new war against Russia. The Russian government deployed two cruiser squadrons in the Atlantic and the Pacific in response to the pressure and threats. Crossing the ocean secretly and rapidly for those times, Russian ships dropped anchor at the U.S.

ports of San Francisco and New York. This demonstrated to the entire world support for the federalists fighting for the abolition of slavery and for the territorial integrity of the United States against the confederates of the rebel south.

The Russian fleet's resolute actions contributed to the accomplishment of this important state mission. It is not necessary to point out that only with the navy was it possible to conduct such demonstrations. And no matter how we view the policies of powers of the past century, this fact is not strictly negative.

By 1869 the Baltic Fleet was capable of handling the missions involved in defending the capital. A remarkable event occurred that same year, one which forced Russia's rivals not only to reckon with her ability to build ships of any class at our own slips but also to form improved combat entities far superior to their foreign counterparts with respect to technical specifications. Construction was begun in Russia on the first destroyer, the PETR VELIKIY. It should also be noted that the Baltic Fleet was already more powerful than the Prussian, Swedish and Danish fleets at that time.

In the '70s Russia began seeking new ways to lift the restrictions on the buildup of the Black Sea Fleet. Czarism had its own reasons for intervening, and Russia contributed to the struggle by the Balkan peoples to free themselves of the Osman yoke.

The Russo-Turkish War broke out in 1877. We had mainly poorly armed steamships in the Black Sea. The Russian sailors compensated for their technical weakness, however, making extensive use of mines and recently-invented torpedos for the first time. The effect was a surprise. The powerful ironclads proved to be extremely unsuited for attacking small and not even very fast torpedo boats. The experience acquired provided a powerful stimulus to the rapid development of ships armed with torpedos. It also demonstrated the enormous difficulties encountered by an army lacking naval support. And although the results of our combat operations on land were successful, the victory could have been far more complete had Russia had a fleet in the Black and Mediterranean seas.

Nonetheless, diplomatic efforts backed up by the state's growing power, including naval power, were crowned with success, and the restrictions on the buildup of the Black Sea Fleet were lifted. This fact confirmed the well-known tenet that a nation which has not had or has lost its naval force is also deprived of influence on world developments, and also of confidence in its independence and security.

In 1881 the so-called Special Conference was set up. It included members of the government, both military departments and the ministry of foreign affairs. Strategic ideas were worked out on the fleet's missions.

For the Baltic this involved being more powerful than all other fleets in the region; for the Black Sea, achieving

lasting superiority over Turkey's fleet; for the Far East, concentrating on defending the main coastal sites. A 20-year program (1881-1900) was accordingly worked out for the navy's development. England and Turkey continued to be considered the most likely enemies. Neither Germany nor especially Japan was regarded as a serious rival at sea. Changes in the situation and in views made it necessary to effect major adjustments in the program (in 1885, 1890, 1895 and 1898).

Ships built during those years met diverse requirements, which accounted for the variety of classes. The latter was also predetermined by the fact that Russia lacked the capacity for the simultaneous construction of large series of ships. Because of this, individual ships or small series were built, and some ships had to be ordered from abroad.

The Special Conference was certainly unable correctly to forecast the development of the operational-strategic situation in each of the theaters. The main error committed by the compilers of this impressive program was that they entirely overlooked the training of personnel. This was a difficult problem, however, for a country in which a considerable portion of the population was still illiterate.

Many operational-strategic errors committed by the government and the naval ministry on the eve of and during the Russo-Japanese War appear natural against this background. This was clearly manifested in the arrangement of a fleet deployed in a theater, in its basing system and its preparation. The irresolute actions of the Russian fleet predetermined the development of failures during the initial period of the war into the disaster at Port Arthur and those of the Manchurian Army and the 2nd Pacific Squadron.

The defeat suffered in the Russo-Japanese War wiped out many years of efforts to build a Russian navy befitting a great naval power. The main sector, the Baltic Sea theater, was once again exposed, just as it had been following the Crimean War. Once again an enormous effort was required to reinforce it, primarily its coastal defenses. And once again voices were raised to limit the matter to that. The land forces were also in need of rearment, particularly since kaiser-ruled Germany's army was reaching its peak on the western borders.

At the same time and despite the defeat and the actual loss of the fleet, Russia had a chance to rapidly rebuild its naval power and not to remain far behind its main rivals for a long time. The main classes of ships of many nations, built at the end of the 19th century, had become obsolete practically simultaneously. A new round of rearment began.

The debate has not yet died down between the historians and theoreticians in various areas on the role of navies, particularly battleships, in the World War of 1914-1918. One point of view is that they invalidated themselves completely and proved that the large shipbuilding program accepted for implementation on the eve of the war

was responsible for the lack of preparedness for the war on the part of Russia's land forces. The entire nation was unprepared for the war, however, but entered the world conflict contrary to its national interests.

The employment of the Russian fleet in that war could be called unsuccessful only by a biased scholar, however. Contrary to the widespread opinion, our fleets operated fairly successfully, particularly in the first two campaigns, and coped with the missions assigned to them by their operational superiors, the commanders of the land fronts.

The fleet in the Baltic supported the grouping of Russian troops on the maritime sector. The defense of the gulfs of Finland and Riga was especially important. The sailors successfully accomplished these missions right up until mid-1917. Furthermore, the fleet fought on the naval communication lines along which strategic raw materials were shipped from Sweden to Germany. A mine danger was created so serious to the enemy that he lost dozens of combat ships and transports, and he abandoned active operations at the end of 1914 and sharply curtailed shipping.

The combat operations conducted by the Maritime Fleet brought it an important success. It succeeded in blocking the German-Greek fleet in the Bosphorus in the 1916 campaign and partially in the 1917 campaign as well, and provided significant support for our land troops operating on the maritime sector. Throughout the war the fleet prepared itself for landing a strategic force to capture the Bosphorus and was close to implementing this plan.

The significance of the Northern Fleet was demonstrated immediately when the world war began. The Arctic Flotilla formed there secured the ever-increasing volume of shipping among the allies and engaged in ASW warfare and antime operations.

Our strategic operational naval art was born at that time. The fleet, which had become a formation of diverse forces, began to conduct naval operations.

As fate would have it Russia, which had suffered a cruel defeat and been torn apart by two revolutions, withdrew from the war. The extremely burdensome terms of the Brest Treaty, the civil war, intervention and devastation brought about almost a total loss of the Russian navy. After the civil war ended, it was necessary first to restore that which remained and then rebuild the navy. At the beginning of the 20th century, when a unified military doctrine was being rapidly developed for the Soviet state, prerevolutionary views on the role and place of the navy within the armed forces underwent major criticism. They were especially sharply rejected by representatives of the so-called "new school," who were drawn to the political aspect of military doctrine. Believing that the Soviet Union was a new type of state and that the dictatorship of the proletariat should create a new, socialist military art fundamentally different from bourgeois military art, they underestimated the most general

laws of warfare, which do not depend upon the policy of those classes in the interest of which wars are conducted. They were inclined to exaggerate the capabilities of the new troop arms: light forces, positional mine weapons and coastal defense. Believing that the outcome of a future war would be determined on land, they advocated the building of a fleet to operate in the maritime zone and believed that it was possible to solve the problem of combatting superior forces of a likely enemy at sea with so-called "small-scale warfare."

The "old school" maintained that our shipbuilding should take the same route as the development of fleets for the great naval powers. Theoreticians of this school advocated having all classes of combat ships in the navy, including battleships and aircraft-carriers. They proposed that the main missions should be accomplished by formations of heavy surface ships, while the light forces, submarines and aircraft would be assigned the role of supporting operations of the fleet's combat nucleus. The theoreticians of both groups were given to extremes. The struggle of views was expressed not just in theoretical journals, however, but also in the practical construction and preparation of the navy. Still, during the second half of the '30s the nation's government naturally set the goal of building a large oceangoing fleet. It was forced to do so by the naval arms race in which Germany and Japan were becoming increasingly involved. It was also motivated by the development of strategy and a new branch of military theory, operational art.

The Great Patriotic War prevented the completion of the grand project gotten underway during the years 1936-1941. Only unfinished battleships and heavy cruisers remained. It was for the same reason also impossible to completely incorporate views contained in such operational-tactical documents as the 1940 Temporary Manual for Conducting Naval Operations and the 1937 Combat Regulations of the Naval Forces.

During the Great Patriotic War the navy's combat activity consisted mainly in supporting troops on the maritime sectors. The fleet protected its bases along with the land forces, participating in defensive and offensive operations and in operational and tactical landing operations.

The fleets independently combatted enemy naval communications and defended ours, and destroyed enemy naval forces at sea and at their bases. In the course of systematic combat operations they made an enormous effort to maintain favorable operational conditions in their zones. The situation of the fleets and their ability to operate and execute their assigned missions depended as never before upon the situation in the land theaters. Despite the fact that the Black Sea Fleet was in a critical state during the first period of the war and the Baltic Fleet was actually blockaded at Kronstadt and Leningrad, they both continued to fight to the end of the war and to be an extremely important strategic factor in their maritime theaters.

The situation in the north developed somewhat differently. The weakness of our naval forces was fully manifested there. As a result there arose a certain dependency upon the allies, without which it was impossible to secure the movement of external convoys. A shortage of submarines, bombers and torpedo boats reduced the fleet's capabilities, and the "Northern Norway" grouping was supplied almost entirely by sea. All of this was due not just to the limited economic possibilities and to a shortage of assets and time to gain control of the vast and complex theater, but also to a certain underestimation of its significance which existed in the interim between wars.

Nonetheless, the navy fulfilled its duty to the end and made an irreplaceable contribution to our great Victory.

World War II overturned prewar views on the role and place of heavy artillery ships in combat operations and underscored the increased importance of aircraft and submarines in warfare in sea and ocean theaters of military operations. Nuclear and missile weapons were used for the first time in this war.

There were collisions, however. The operational subordination of the fleets to axes, fronts and even armies during the Great Patriotic War was not purely a boon. Many combined-arms commanders had a poor understanding of the operational capabilities of the fleets and either assigned them missions in a most generalized form or contained their operations by involving them only in providing direct support for the land troops. The General Naval Staff and the people's commissariat of the navy sometimes found themselves in an ambiguous position since the General Staff of the Red Army did not always consider their opinion and sometimes even failed to involve them in the planning of operations involving participation by the fleets and flotillas. All of this was a direct result of ideas deeply rooted in the top element of the Red Army that the fleet should have a purely subordinate role and of neglect for the study of forms and methods of employing it in warfare on the part of the combined-arms commanders.

The postwar development of the navy has been relatively poorly studied, which has resulted in the appearance of writings containing superficial and incorrect analyses of that complex and extremely contradictory process. There is also a need for a more thorough study of the periodization of that segment of the navy's history.

At the same time it is an irrefutable fact that the way the navy was developed and prepared was greatly influenced by the objective circumstances into which our nation was placed following its break with its allies in the Anti-Hitlerite coalition and the beginning of the cold war. After suffering enormous human and material losses, it was forced to accept the challenge of a coalition of states headed by a great naval and land power whose economy had not only not suffered during the world war but, on the contrary, had risen significantly from the "yeast" of military orders.

CIS/RUSSIAN MILITARY ISSUES

Whatever the causes of the cold war, the scholars will properly appreciate the validity of the historic feat of our people, who did not permit forces which had already begun to lose their reason due to their nuclear monopoly to gain the upper hand. Whatever the cost of parity in nuclear missiles, it was due precisely to this that mankind avoided the nightmare of a new world war, and there have been more than enough excuses for unleashing one during the 46 postwar years.

I would like to point out in connection with this, that statements which have recently appeared in certain means of mass media to the effect that the development of our navy had an aggressive orientation and was based on a striving to gain superiority over the naval forces of the USA and its NATO allies are groundless.

The construction of an oceangoing navy was caused precisely by the superior naval strength of the Western powers united against the USSR. And the deployment of naval forces in remote regions of the World Ocean was caused by the fact that nuclear-powered submarines with ballistic missiles had become the main component of the U.S. nuclear triad. This is why most of our surface ships were ASW ships. Most of the submarines were also built for ASW purposes.

At the same time the subjective factor also had a powerful influence upon the development of the navy after 1945. We are very familiar with the drama of Fleet Admiral of the Soviet Union Nikolay Gerasimovich Kuznetsov. An outstanding navy man, he understood better than anyone the missions facing the navy in the new era, the era of weapons of mass destruction and of the scientific and technological revolution. He experienced the full extent of the burden, sometimes the hopelessness, of opposing the subjectivism of Stalin, Khrushchev and Zhukov, who had views on the role and place of the navy in a future war, views which the subsequent development of our own and foreign fleets proved to be erroneous.

Stalin's obsessions resulted in senseless outlays on the construction of obsolete, heavy artillery ships. Khrushchev's actions were marked by a substantial undermining of the power of our surface forces and burdensome outlays on the naval aviation and coastal defense. All of this had to be corrected, and very rapidly, without considering the cost. And today it is time to give serious thought to these facts once again.

The many years of Sergey Georgiyevich Gorshkov as commander in chief of the navy await study. It can only be said that he had to engage in a determined struggle with people who did not understand the significance of the navy. Developing the concept of "a state's naval power" in his works, Gorshkov maintained that this is primarily an economic and political matter, only in third place a military matter. He regarded the fleet which served the state's interests as only one component of the nation's naval strength.

The drama of our postwar history is not yet fully recognized. The country was laid low by military confrontation with practically the rest of the world. And despite this, with a significant inferiority to the USA and its allies in gross national product and level of development of the basic and science-intensive branches of industry, our country succeeded in achieving parity in nuclear missiles, and our navy became one of the most important components of its nuclear triad.

In the mid-'80s, convinced that a further buildup of the nuclear capability carried the threat of economic collapse, the leadership of the USSR began a significant reduction of the SNV [strategic offensive weapons]. At approximately the same time intensive work was begun to shape a new military doctrine for the state, which for understandable reasons has not been completed to this day.

This process was based on the tenets of defense adequacy, which became the core of our new military doctrine. Most unfortunately, however, there is little to be seen of a role and place for the navy in it.

The experience of history has shown, however, that this will evoke many years of stagnation in the construction and preparation of the navy and carries the danger of another rollback from the positions we have gained, and this is fraught with dangerous consequences.

In any case the decision of the navy's fate should not be the monopoly of those who have a strange inability to see the obvious, that fact that a certain curtailment of programs for the extensive development of the navies of the leading naval powers is more than made up in the qualitative aspect of their plans for developing their naval forces, which are oriented toward the future, that is, toward the 21st century.

In this situation, no matter how difficult the economic situation in the nation, the implementation of 5- and 10-year shipbuilding programs should continue. Furthermore, we must achieve balanced development of the navy with a leading role for submarines and aircraft, bearing in mind the Persian Gulf War, which convincingly demonstrated the main trends in the development of contemporary armed forces. After all, it would not have been possible to deploy a powerful and mobile grouping of naval forces armed with high-precision weapons in a theater of military operations far removed from the USA and the territories of most countries of the anti-Iraqi coalition without absolute superiority at sea for the allies. Naval forces played a crucial role during the active phase of that war. The presence of their aircraft-carriers predetermined to a significant degree the great effectiveness of the operations of deck-based aircraft, which decided the outcome of the entire operation.

It would therefore appear to be an erroneous move to abandon the construction of aircraft-carrying ships (which have not been rejected by one of the leading naval

powers), because aircraft-carrying ships constitute a concentration, as it were, of the achievements of basic science and modern technology.

Curtailment of the construction of new missile and ASW ships armed with high-precision weapons will also result in irreplaceable losses. Nor can we abandon once and for all the construction of landing ships as the most important component of mobile forces. Naturally, the number of groupings and ships must be optimal with respect to the development of the fleets of other nations and to the state's economic capabilities.

At the beginning of this year claims laid on the Black Sea Fleet by the president of Ukraine brought greatly heightened attention to the navy's problems. This produced an acute crisis in the still-weak commonwealth and served as the excuse for similar claims by Azerbaijan, Turkmenia, Byelorussia and the Baltic states.

We have learned once again from experience how dangerous it is to leave open the most important aspects of defense policy and put off agreements on a unified strategic military space under a unified strategic command.

Whatever the considerations guiding the politicians, forcing a split of military units from their central leadership, command and control destroys the Commonwealth's system of common security, and forceful methods of realizing egotistical plans for "building" one's own armies can have unpredictable consequences for the stability not just of Russia but the CIS as well. The unity and integrity of the navy is therefore a contemporary and correct demand. There are at least four extremely important factors behind this: military-political, economic, organizational-technical and historical.

There is no denying the fact that Russia today, just as prior to Peter, needs to have access to the Black and Baltic seas, without which normal development of the enormous nation is inconceivable. The system of security is being eliminated in these maritime theaters of military operations, a system which was developed from the year 1696, since no CIS state but Russia is capable of building any sort of significant fleets. Furthermore, one has to consider the fact that Russia has special historical rights to a navy. For centuries it existed as a Russian fleet, and as part of the USSR the republic always made the crucial contribution to the construction and manning of the navy.

The navy is first of all a unified infrastructure built by means of the entire country's scientific and economic capability and viable only with solid internal ties between the provision and training of personnel, shipbuilding and armament, the development of naval art, operational, combat and mobilizational readiness, basing and preparation of the theaters and all the other components, the sum total of which constitutes the modern navy. It will take only a matter of months to destroy this, but more decades to rebuild.

Footnotes

1. P. Belavenets, "Do We Need a Navy, and its Significance in Russia's History," Saint Petersburg, 1910, p. 99.

2. Ibid., p. 161.

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Kasatonov Downplays Ukraine Shipbuilding

92UM0974A Kiev RABOCHAYA GAZETA in Russian
15 Apr 92 p 1

[Article by UKRINFORM correspondent A. Kuznetsov in the "Politics and Time" column: "The Navy, Ships, and 'Boxes'"]

[Text] Admiral Kasatonov and other persons, in their questioning of Ukraine's right to base the fleet on its territory, contend that Nikolayev made only the "boxes" of ships. However, even this kind of opinion of the shipbuilders' labors cannot help but generate respect and admiration. Take for example the flagship of the former Union's Navy - the Admiral of the Fleet Kuznetsov, which has departed for the North. She consists of more than 3,500 compartments; her 300-meter hull took shape over a period of over 3 years. The fitting out process took even longer. Is that any way to speak about a "box"?

"Indeed, our shipyard received construction materials from all parts of the Union, and it is unfair to downplay the role and contribution of the Ukraine in the creation of the fleet remaining after the demise of the USSR," said Captain 1st Rank (Ret.) Vitaliy Vashchilenko, who is vice-president of the Ukrainian Scientific and Engineering Society of Shipbuilders. "Relegating Nikolayevans to the status of makers of 'boxes' is misleading and a manifestation of ignorance."

There are items we can add to what the specialist said. The Ukraine's military-industrial complex designed and manufactured for the USSR Navy hydroacoustics, combat information systems, radar equipment, navigation and communications gear, deck appliances and machinery, air conditioning systems, diesel-electric generators, and other items. It is said that the propulsion system is the heart of a ship. Well, many ships in service in the four fleets of the former Union are fitted with gas turbine installations that were developed and manufactured in Nikolayev proper.

The Ukraine should have her own Navy, reasons V. V. Vashchilenko. Even Peter I back in his time said the following about the state: "A potentate possessing an army has one hand; if a navy, he has two hands." Sevastopol should remain as the headquarters of the Ukraine's Naval Forces. It could be the base of the CIS Mediterranean Squadron, which could be assigned a strategic mission.

**Black Sea Fleet Mission, Russian 'Hegemony'
Ambitions Viewed**

92UM0974B Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
24 Apr 92 p 2

[Article by Maj Gen B. Lavrinenko: "No Good to Come of It!"]

[Text] [NARODNAYA ARMIYA introduction] Discussions dealing with determination of the strategic forces of the Black Sea Fleet are heating up. The authorities of the CIS Unified Armed Forces are exerting increasing pressure on recalcitrant commanders—those who have taken the oath of allegiance to the people of the Ukraine. Newly-appearing strategists are attempting to an ever greater extent to endow the Navy and the Fleet with a strategic status.

Why is the fleet situation being built up to such an extent? Why wreck the future of officers who just a short time ago were held in high regard but now are being removed from their positions and discharged from the Army? Who needs that?

The Black Sea never was strategic; its basin involves the interests of many states: Ukraine, Russia, Georgia, Turkey, Bulgaria, and Romania. A navy is employed to carry out missions to the extent of the length of a shoreline. The longest shoreline belongs to Ukraine (1,080 km) and Turkey (1,500 km). Russia, which lays claim to hegemony in the Black Sea, possesses a coast of 320 km.

The narrowness of the outlet to the Mediterranean Sea through the Bosphorus, Dardenelles, past Gibraltar, and through the Suez Canal into the strategic waters of the world's oceans of and by itself dictates that the Black Sea basin is closed and can be beneficial to the resolution of tasks related to national security interests of the states. In this connection, a navy's possessing an outlet to the oceanic arena is associated with interests of another kind. However, Ukraine has no interest in the world's oceans, let alone in the latter as pertaining to her Navy.

When talk comes to missions that were carried out by the Black Sea Fleet in the sea's waters, strategic were something they were not. Textbooks on strategy teach that strategic groups are formed in accordance with a strategic situation or intent.

So Admiral Kapitanets appeared on television, saying that we - meaning the CIS - are offering Ukraine's military leadership the opportunity of determining the principles whereby the fleet will be employed in the Black Sea, and that the missions proper are something for him to decide. Only then could there be talk of the formation and transfer of forces. This would involve approximately 20 to 22 percent of all forces, perhaps less.

I would like to pose a question: What is to be said about the laws passed relative to a sovereign Ukraine, about her people's desire to have their own army and navy?

The answer can be quite simple: The desires and will of the people must be respected. That is the way this is done in all countries. As far as how the country is to handle its own navy, that is our concern.

Supporting the highly-placed naval chiefs are prominent persons in Russia, whom the people have entrusted with power, but not the right to create antagonism. Naval honor has always required that all military leaders treat peoples and their leadership with respect, something which cannot be said about the present leaders of the Black Sea Fleet.

As far as strategic forces are concerned, Ukraine possesses the right to determine for herself the mission and composition of her Army and navy. This all the more, with the entire world's knowing that the Ukraine Armed Forces are intended to carry out missions with the interest of her people and states in mind. Also, everyone is well aware that Ukraine has no designs on territory belonging to other states, since she has agreed to the particular borders and is in strict observance of her obligations in this regard.

Now about the makeup of the fleet, expenditures for its construction and upkeep, and its maintenance in constant combat readiness.

The Black Sea Fleet consists of the following forces: surface, submarine, aviation units, and support units. In this connection, to say that these forces include the latest surface combatants, submarines, fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft would be less than accurate. What has been retained are models which were suitable for internal and operational needs of the former Union. More modern forces were and are being employed in the Northern Fleet and the Pacific Ocean Fleet.

But the fleet's construction and maintenance expenses were also borne by Ukraine, the same as other former union republics. The outlays amounted to about 20 percent of the former Union's state budget. It would be in order to initiate discussions relative to distributing a portion of the forces - from other fleets - to Ukraine (according to amount of expenses), i.e., so that she would receive her share.

However, that is not the way the issue has been set up. It has been specifically one of nothing more than transfer of Black Sea Fleet forces. Ukraine's announcement to the entire world of her being a nuclear-free power deprived the question of the strategic nuclear forces of its urgency; after all nuclear munitions will be removed from the territory of Ukraine, the question will become totally devoid of significance. That is, there no longer will be any need to speak of whatever relevance submarines, surface combatants, and aircraft may have to strategic forces.

The unwillingness to transfer fleet forces to Ukraine has nothing to do with determination of the strategic forces. This does constitute a potent political pressure exerted on the process of formation of the Armed Forces and on

a sovereign Ukraine in general. This is the same pressure that has been developed with the age-old intent to subjugate everyone; an unwillingness to recognize the objective processes occurring in the world and the former Union; a belief in force; a disrespect for the desires of other peoples to garner the support of the leaders of Russia; with the military leadership obediently carrying out their will.

In ignoring the rules of elementary decency, the Black Sea Fleet authorities can go so far as to refuse to meet with Ukraine's people's deputies, refuse the representatives of her Ministry of Defense permission to visit military garrisons and ships, and keep the personnel in a state of isolation. This has happened. With the dearth of information being suffered by the population of the Crimea, it is difficult for Black Sea Fleet members to determine their place in the scale of things. Even at that, many officers, warrant officers, and seamen have taken the oath of allegiance to the people of Ukraine.

The outlook for continuing development of events in the Crimea and the Black Sea Fleet issue are such that the objective process of creating a Ukraine fleet in the Black Sea will go on. Attempts by Russia to employ the age-old power politics method will not result in anything good.

Now that Georgia has announced the creation of her own national Armed Forces, it may be expected that she will raise the question of protecting her coastal boundary, the length of which measures 360 km. There can be no question but that a part of the fleet should go to Georgia. Continued opposition to the interests of states bordering on Black Sea waters is foolish. The holding back of the process of creation of navies for independent states is impossible, and attempts to resolve the problems associated with the sea basin within the limitation of the interests of a single state are doomed to failure.

It would be more beneficial if Ukraine, Russia, and Georgia were to possess forces sufficient to protect their water boundaries in the interests of peoples of sovereign republics. This problem, while in the process of resolution, must be approached in a spirit of mutual understanding on the part of interested and equal sides.

CIS: REAR SERVICES, SUPPORT ISSUES

Commentary on Status of Military-Economic Activities

92UM0948B Moscow TRUD in Russian 21 Apr 92 p 2

[Article by V. Bardurkin: "They Have Set Out to Steal"]

[Text] I first encountered "military" commerce for the first time when I was assembling the material for an article on the overseas sales of decommissioned ships and submarines.

At that time I was struck not so much by the economic dilettantism but by the self-seeking and the disregard of

state interests for the sake of the private pocket. Themselves not sinless, the entrepreneurs in confidential talks were struck with the greed of the officials in epaulets.

Soon thereafter there appeared in the press announcements on the stock companies and firms which were being set up everywhere and were engaged "in the sale of discarded military property." They all had set the noble goal for themselves of earning money to provide social protection for the servicemen. The money was actually very needed. The Army has over 200,000 apartmentless persons and the pay is miserly. Then there is the cut-back which also will make itself felt. In the budget, funds are catastrophically in short supply and hence one must not put any particular hope on the state. This is what was stated by the military command with the blessing of the government in launching a self-financing campaign.

Fine, there was some money to be made. We have repeatedly written about the "cemeteries" of tanks and ships, the ownerless ranges and dumps with rusting equipment. The total value of the military property to be discarded as a result of the reduction in the Army, in the estimates of specialists, has been judged at no more or no less than a trillion rubles at last year's prices. Of course, there are more than enough persons who wish to "help" in selling this wealth. And so began the "commerce" but this was simply theft. Because anyone who will take the trouble can partake in the deed, both incompetent persons and the sharp.

However soon thereafter an end was put to this license. Recovering from the euphoria of the "dizzying successes," the command of the Armed Forces banned any sales except by the commercial center which was organized specifically for this purpose. This center began its work by collecting information not only on what the army actually possessed, but also on the activities of the previously created commercial structures. As might be expected, the commercial center collected a good deal. As a result a report with specific instances of violations was put on the desk of the commander-in-chief.

Most probably, this official-use document would have remained a secret for all had the Presidium of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet not passed on 1 April the Decree "On Priorities in Military Policy." In this the Committee on the Questions of Legality, Law and Order and the Combating of Crime was ordered, together with the Budget Control Committee, to analyze the commercial activities of the military and military-industrial structures.

The reaction to this decree came with amazing speed for our bureaucratic apparatus. Just 3 days later, the Commander-in-Chief Shaposhnikov signed Order No 126 which virtually banned any commercial activity in the Armed Forces and eliminated the existing entrepreneurial structures. This is all seemingly well and good (it has long been high time for the military leaders not to be distracted from performing their immediate duties) but the document ended up premature. Everything was

settled seemingly in a single stroke as there were now no more entrepreneurial structures, and hence nothing to inspect and no measures to be applied to anyone.

As is known, orders are prepared for the commander-in-chief. No 126 was no exception. It would be interesting to know whether among its authors were those who were members of the scandalously known "Military Stock Exchange Section" or the Stock Company Navikon which was very attractive from the legality viewpoint?

Incidentally, another victim of the guillotine was the initiator of the scandal, the commercial center which in essence at present is the sole state (budget-supported!) body capable with maximum benefit of selling and utilizing the decommissioned military equipment on a commercial basis.

I have no doubt that the "baggage" worked out by its specialists in just 2 months will not stand idle. Agreements beneficial to the state and the army, having already been prepared and even signed by the center with Russian and foreign firms, would certainly be taken up by its legal successors. Possibly there will be no one to pass them on to. In the opinion of the Chairman of the State Commission on the Forming of Russian Military Structures D. Volkogonov, such a body will be necessary for the future Ministry of Defense. And the Russian government is interested in such specialists.

The concern lies elsewhere. We have again demonstrated to the entire business world that it is unsafe to collaborate with us. Because rashly taken decisions are cancelled just as rashly. The only question is who benefits from this?

Thieves Attack Military Units Food Supplies

*92UM0970A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
29 Apr 92 p 1*

[Article by Captain A. Veklich: "Previously They Only Sought Weapons; Now They Are Hunting for Food as Well. Soldiers Are Again Having to Protect Themselves"]

[Text] In Khakasiya, incidents of attacks on food warehouses, supplementary farms and other facilities where valuable materiel is stored for military units have become more frequent.

Recently, a group of armed individuals attacked a supplementary farm in a garrison headed by Major Yuri Burinik. The thieves intended to steal pigs. Unarmed soldiers who were working at the supplementary farm that day found themselves hostages of the thieves. The unit duty officer had to use a weapon to free the soldiers and force the uninvited guests to head home. Becoming even more bold, the thieves opened fire against the officer who miraculously survived.

The attackers were detained and turned over to police officials with the help of reinforcements that had arrived from the unit. It turned out that some of them had previously been tried. They had recently been "specializing" in supplementary farms.

Literally the next day, servicemen of a neighboring unit blocked the path of unknown individuals in a car who were attempting to make their way to a warehouse of automotive spare parts.

Lieutenant Colonel Mikhail Kulchavyy, a people's deputy of the Republic of Khakasiya, told our correspondent that recently such things have been occurring virtually weekly. The thieves are being attracted not so much by weapons, which are by no means safe to sell, as by foodstuffs, clothing, fuel and spare parts for automotive equipment, in a word, by things that can be profitably sold without repercussion.

INTERREGIONAL MILITARY ISSUES

Planes Will Return to Ukraine if Fuel Provided

92UM0966B Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
21 Apr 92 p 1

[Article by Ukrinform correspondent Galina Nekrasova under the rubric "Well, Well!": "If There Is Fuel, the Planes Will Return"]

[Text] "If the Ministry of Defense provides the fuel, we shall return the planes," Col Aleksandr Fomin, commander of the Stryy Long-Range Air Regiment, informed reporters.

Let us review the situation over which Maj Gen Justice Vasiliy Melnichuk, judge advocate for the Carpathian Military District, called the unit commander to accountability. On 6 February of this year six strategic bombers were transferred to Bobruysk without the agreement of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, ostensibly for the combat training of the young crews. They have still not been returned to the airfield at the city of Stryy.

Col Aleksandr Fomin stated that this was a fateful happenstance which occurred: the flight of the aircraft from Starokonstantinov and Stryy. The fact is that the last centralized delivery of fuel to the Carpathian region occurred on 12 December of last year. The thousand tons of fuel was enough for a week of flights. Any kind of combat training for the pilots is out of the question. The republics of Russia and Belarus, which have reserves of fuel and lubricants for strategic bombers, do not send them to Ukraine without a license. It was therefore advantageous to send the crews temporarily to Bobruysk so that the airmen would not lose their flight skills.

"For me the most important thing is the regiment's combat training and not where the aircraft are located," the unit commander said.

During that time the air defense commander of the Carpathian Military District informed the long-range air regiment of a decree issued by the president of Ukraine that all military formations located within the republic are administratively subordinate to the Ministry of Defense, while the strategic nuclear forces will continue to be operationally subordinate to the commander in chief of the CIS Joint Forces until they are completely disbanded.

Commanders Discuss State, Withdrawal Of North-West Group Of Forces

92UM0946B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Apr 92 First Edition p 2

[North-West Group of Forces commanding officers interviewed by Colonel M. Ziyeminsh, Captain 1st Rank V. Gromak, and Major A. Ivanov: "Concerns Regarding Forces in the Baltic Region: Russia Isn't Waiting For Us Yet"]

[Text] The editors have given the floor to the commanders of our forces stationed in the Baltic region three times in the past six months.

Now, it seems, much has been clarified. The North-West Group of Forces, the Baltic Fleet, and the Baltic Border District have been taken under Russian jurisdiction. For the past two months, Russia has been holding negotiations with Latvia and Lithuania, and talks with Estonia will come next. Russia's position, succinctly put, is as follows: that the factor of social protection for servicemen be taken into account in determining the status of the forces and the time table for withdrawing them.

Should this be done, in experts' opinion, a complete withdrawal will take five to seven years. But our partners are insisting more and more firmly that the Russian divisions be pulled out immediately. In short, more uncertainty for the military.

It's no accident that Marshal of Aviation Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, Commander in Chief of CIS Joint Armed Forces, spoke with pain about this subject in his address to the Sixth Congress of Russian People's Deputies.

And now we give the floor to the commanders.

Lieutenant-General Valentin Gaponenko, commander of the Baltic Border District:

A legal basis for our presence in the region exists—it is President B. Yeltsin's decree on transferring the Baltic Military District to Russian jurisdiction. This eliminates grounds for any talk about "what mission is being carried out by the border troops of the former USSR on the territory of the independent Baltic countries." The same decree names the commander of the border district as the Russian Federation's duly authorized representative on questions relating to the presence and withdrawal of CIS border troops from Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, and the Russian state delegation is charged with initiating talks with delegations from the three Baltic States in order to determine the status of the forces on their territory and to reach agreement on the withdrawal of the forces and on joint efforts to protect borders during the withdrawal period.

The process has begun. But what will follow? On March 27, we held a working meeting with the leadership of the Latvian Ministry of Defense and the republic's border forces. We intend to hold similar meetings of a consultative, so to speak, character with similar agencies of the Lithuanian and Estonian Republics in the near future.

After just one meeting it's too early to talk about any concrete results, but the main points of our negotiating partners' positions were visible, so to speak, to the naked eye: They attach prime importance to the time tables and pace of the border troops' withdraw from Latvian territory.

And what about the future of people who find themselves in that country not of their own will? What will happen with the border forces' real estate, buildings and other property, whose total value at current prices is something on the

order of 700 million rubles? Is it correct to consider these to be matters of secondary importance? For us border troops, as well as for the group being withdrawn as a whole, the most urgent question at present is that of providing the troops at their new locations with all essentials and with social protection.

At the same time, it must be borne in mind that we will have to begin setting up equipping for the new borders virtually from scratch. This must be taken into account. A concrete decision on the entire set of problems will be worked out in the state-to-state negotiations. But my opinion is this: The pace of the border forces' withdrawal must be directly pegged to the degree to which borders are equipped at the new location.

Major-General of Aviation Ziya Abdurakhmanov, commander of an air defense division in Estonia:

Russia has taken the troops in the Baltic region under its jurisdiction. But we have yet to sense or learn what specifically lies behind this political step. Our position was difficult in the past and remains so.

For example, officers can reside in the republic for one year, and then are obliged to leave it. Housing vacated by servicemen, even though it is attached to a unit, cannot be occupied a second time by families of officers and warrant officers. Otherwise, the unit command gets a warning from the procuracy.

We have been told that our division will be disbanded. Officers, warrant officers, and members of their families are coming to me and asking what is going to happen to them. I am unable to give them any specific answers. Another concern is the grave economic situation of servicemen. Judge for yourselves. Monthly apartment rent has gone up to 1,500 rubles, a kilo of butter costs 500 rubles, a loaf of bread sells for 10 to 12 rubles.

How are these families to live on officers' salaries alone, when the wives can't find work?

Colonel Valeriy Frolov, commander of a motorized infantry division in Vilnius:

To some extent, work duties with training sessions, firing practice, and so forth distracts the officers from thoughts about their future, even though we have all reconciled ourselves to the thought that we will have to leave. But when and where we go—neither I nor any other officer can answer that question. Total uncertainty.

Guards Colonel Ivan Chernykh, commander of a Baltic Fleet coastal defense division in Klaipeda:

The situation in the division is difficult. City banks continue to refuse to let us withdraw money, citing the lack of corresponding agreements between the Russian and Lithuanian governments. Local authorities are demanding that we turn over to them the garrison officers' club, the garrison department store, and other facilities currently occupied by the military. A special

question is what will happen to the 16 apartment buildings built by military construction workers.

Do my officers know what's going to happen to them. I personally do not. Apparently, the only ones who know anything are those who have submitted requests for discharge into the reserves.

Captain 1st Rank Valeriy Berezutskiy, senior naval chief of the Riga naval garrison:

As a member of the Russian delegation's working group of experts who are doing the groundwork for the state-to-state talks on withdrawing the forces of the former USSR, I took part in a meeting with Latvian experts. It was the second such meeting, and was held in the Latvian city of Ligatne (the first was held in Moscow). In addition to general questions relating to protecting the national security interests of the state we serve, we military personnel were also interested to a considerable extent in the manner in which the future of each one of us is to be decided.

But the Latvian side is clearly dissatisfied with the proposed schedule for withdrawing troops of the former USSR from the republic's territory that was drawn up by the CIS Joint Armed Forces General Staff. They won't even hear of any five to seven years. They see just one option as realistic and final: that all troops without exception be withdrawn from Riga by the end of this year, and that all troops be withdrawn from the republic as a whole by October 1993. That, they say, is when elections to the sejm are scheduled.

But where can the Riga naval garrison be redeployed to? And has anything been done to carry out the redeployment as painlessly as possible? Unfortunately, there are no answers. And why even discuss it when, even under current conditions, we face problems that are hardly going to be solved? And this is not to mention our 300 families of officers and naval warrant officers that do not have housing.

Lieutenant Colonel Valeriy Gerasimov, chief of staff of a motorized infantry division in Tallinn:

In contrast to Latvia and Lithuania, the withdrawal of troops from Estonia has yet to officially begin. In the meantime, our personnel are going about their routine combat training, even though this isn't very easy any more. The most insignificant movements of military hardware in order to support combat training prompt articles in the local press with the underlying message that the military is secretly making preparations for "another coup d'état." Nevertheless, we recently held a routine command and staff training exercise. True, unlike in past years, it was a map exercise held at our permanent deployment locations.

However, I won't hide the fact that people don't know anything for certain about the future. When and where will we go? In direct or indirect form, this question is

heard almost everyday. But neither I nor anyone else can give a definite answer to it—there's still no political decision. And the officers, in planning their futures, usually have to rely only on themselves.

The uncertainty over the future is intensified by the skyrocketing prices in Estonia. For example, mailing a letter, even a letter from a soldier to the CIS countries, now costs 20 rubles, and a one-kilogram package costs 1,200 rubles. A modest dinner for an officer in a cafeteria costs several 10-ruble bills. I say this because no cash compensation can now replace the food ration in kind, and a way should be found to provide the latter.

COMMENTARY BY COLONEL-GENERAL VALERIY MIRONOV, COMMANDER OF THE NORTH-WEST GROUP OF FORCES AND RUSSIAN FEDERATION REPRESENTATIVE ON ISSUES RELATING TO THE TEMPORARY PRESENCE AND WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS AND NAVAL FORCES FROM THE BALTIC REGION:

Despite the seeming slow pace of the negotiation process with the Baltic countries on the withdrawal of troops from the region, the situation at present is entering a qualitatively new stage.

We have fulfilled the agreements reached earlier on commencing the withdrawal of Armed Forces deployed on the territory of Lithuania and Latvia. In the course of the expert groups' work, without waiting for the conclusion of corresponding government agreements, we have also reached agreement on the transfer of a number of military installations to republic and local authorities, with issues relating to the settling of mutual accounts to be resolved subsequently at the government level.

It must be said that the current processes are taking place against the backdrop of differing approaches by Russia and the Baltic countries to the problems relating to the presence and withdrawal of troops from the region. For example, Lithuania and Latvia, in the earlier state-to-state negotiations with delegations from the Russian Federation, agreed to respect Russia's interests with regard to the withdrawal of Armed Forces. Likewise, the Russian Federation delegation pledged to work to resolve all issues relating to the troops' withdrawal with respect for the independence and state sovereignty of the Lithuanian and Latvian Republics and with strict observance of all their laws and all mutual agreements. However, judging from statements by a number of Baltic statesmen, for example, Latvian Foreign Minister J. Jurkans, certain people would like to speed the process of the forces' withdrawal at all costs—or, as people are now saying here, to internationalize them. In this regard, the Latvian Foreign Minister said the following: "It is essential to reach agreement with Russia on a time table for withdrawing the army by July. Otherwise, the Baltic countries will not sign the documents of the Helsinki-II meeting. Our most important task at present is to achieve the internationalization of this problem within the process of the Conference on Security

and Cooperation in Europe, in order that the community helps us to resolve possible conflicts."

What can be said appropos of this? We military personnel are not against the forces' withdrawal; moreover, we agree with the view that the time table for the forces' withdrawal should be as compressed as possible. But one also has to understand that such actions require the adoption of the corresponding political decisions. Instances in which an unhealthy atmosphere is sometimes fomented around military units in the region, attempts are made to seize installations by force, and natural measures taken by commanding officers to reinforce their security are presented as all but criminal acts seem utterly incomprehensible against this backdrop. And what is one to think of attempts to cut off utilities to entire military compounds and to freeze their bank accounts?

Sharply and justifiably, commanders are raising questions of the social protection of servicemen in light of the impending troop withdrawal from the region—above all where housing is concerned. The group of forces is on its own currently building something on the order of 1,800 apartments in various parts of Russia. We are financing this with proceeds from the sale of military property. The scale of construction must be expanded.

Despite the very strained economic situation in Russia, a streamlined government program is needed for providing installations and accommodations for the forces being withdrawn from the Baltic countries, above all where housing construction is concerned.

Detention, Freeing of Col Chernykh Detailed

*92UM0949A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
10 Apr 92 First Edition p 1*

[Article by Captain 2nd Class V. Gromak: "How Guard Colonel Ivan Chernykh Was Freed: Our Correspondent Became Involved in These Events"]

[Text] KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has already reported that in Klaipeda the Commander of the Baltic Fleet Coastal Defense Division, Guards Colonel Ivan Chernykh, was detained by unknown persons, taken into custody, and driven off in an unknown direction.

This incident caused a stir in not only the coastal defense division, but in the entire fleet.

Toward morning on April 8th, the situation became clear: Guards Colonel Ivan Chernykh was at the SIZO [strict confinement prison] in the city of Vilnius. During the night a note was delivered to the KPP [check point] of a motorized rifle division (Severnyy gorodok [the northern cantonment] in Vilnius). The note was taken at once by the person on duty to the division commander, Colonel Valeriy Frolov. Valeriy Dmitriyevich showed me this note. The text was as follows:

"I, Colonel Chernykh, I. G., was seized at 19:45 7/04 by the police of Klaipeda. I was taken to interrogation

facility 04-1236 in Vilnius. Klaypeda's call sign is "Uchebnik" through "Reklama." Please inform the division duty officer. My aide and driver were with me. The reason has not been explained."

On the back side of the note there was an addition: "Pistol confiscated by police personnel. PM PSM 5-45. Number 0875. 24:00 8/04/92."

Further events unfolded as follows (in chronological order):

At 12:10 (given in local time from here on) the SZGV [North-Western Group of Troops] Commander-in-Chief, Colonel-General Valeriy Mironov's plane landed at the Vilnius airport. He was accompanied by the BF [Baltic Fleet] Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Vladimir Yegorov, representatives from the military prosecutor's office, and our correspondent.

At 12:45 Colonel-General Mironov contacted Lithuanian Supreme Soviet representative, Vytautas Landsbergis by phone from the office of the commander of the Vilnius motorized rifle division and arranged a meeting.

13:18 - 13:33. Supreme Soviet security gained confirmation for our vehicles to pass through to the Supreme Soviet building.

13:40 - 15:15. Negotiations held by Colonel-General Mironov and Admiral Yegorov with Lithuanian Supreme Soviet representative Landsbergis. In attendance from the Lithuanian side were Landsbergis' deputy, K. Moteka, the Deputy Minister for Territorial Protection, I. Gyachas, and Lithuanian Republic Prosecutor General A. Paulaykas.

I was also present at the negotiations, and kept a complete record of them. Due to limited space in the news column, however, I am unable to give the conversation in its entirety. Colonel-General Mironov, as the authorized representative of the Russian Federation in matters concerning the stationing and withdrawal of troops from the Baltic states, strongly protested the detention in Klaypeda of the commander of the coastal defense division, Guards Colonel Chernykh, a Russian citizen. He also protested the fact that he was being held in an interrogation facility. Landsbergis explained the reason for Colonel Chernykh's detention: Criminal proceedings have been brought against Chernykh by the Lithuanian procurator's office in connection with the events that took place in August. On the basis of the laws of the Lithuanian Republic, he was taken into custody. The Lithuanian procurator's office has charged Colonel Chernykh with involvement in the events which occurred in August of last year, in the attempt to alter the makeup of the Lithuanian government.

The negotiations did not go smoothly. It was only Colonel-General Mironov's restraint, tact, and diplomacy that kept them on the right course. During the negotiations Landsbergis was offered a solution by the division Officers' Assembly, accompanied by a request

to free the commander. Landsbergis interpreted it as an ultimatum, and the topic of the negotiations veered far from the fate of the division commander. Mironov and Yegorov, however, held fast.

15:15. The Lithuanian delegation left to deliberate. After forty minutes negotiations resumed. Landsbergis offered a new proposal stipulating that Chernykh would have to provide the Lithuanian procurator's office with a deposition. Only then, he said, would it be possible, with the representative of the Russian MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs], to resolve the question of Chernykh's release from custody on bail.

17:15. The deputy chief of the Russian MID consular service, Nikolay Makarov, arrived in Vilnius from Moscow on a scheduled flight.

21:05 - 21:55. The documents necessary for the officer's release were coordinated.

22:15. Vytautas Landsbergis and Colonel-General Valeriy Mironov signed a joint communique.

22:55. At the Vilnius airport Lithuanian Republic MID representatives, Linas Kuchinskas and Rimantas Shidlauskas, delivered Russian Federation citizen, Guards Colonel Chernykh, to the Russian MID representative.

After midnight, Moscow-time, Colonel-General Mironov's plane set course for Kaliningrad.

Ivan Grigoryevich Chernykh held up magnificently, although the past 24 hours had left a noticeable mark on his face. He said, at the police station, and after that at the SIZO, they had tried to taunt him, a Russian officer, in every way. They wanted to humiliate him. Until 3 o'clock in the morning they had tried to forcibly remove the fleet coastal forces officer's uniform he was wearing, to which Chernykh declared: "You can beat me, but I will not remove my uniform."

Captain 2nd Class, V. Gromak.

Postscript. As was reported to the editor's office of the CIS OVS [Unified Armed Forces] press center, the resolute and key position taken by the Russian MID and CIS OVS command played a decisive role in the release of Guards Colonel Ivan Chernykh.

April 8th Marshal of Aviation Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov directed a letter to the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Soviet representative Vytautas Landsbergis. In the letter he demanded the immediate release of Colonel Chernykh. The letter also noted that there had been incidents in the past where military servicemen under Russian jurisdiction had been unlawfully detained by Lithuanian authorities. The actions of the Lithuanian authorities contradict international law, the letter emphasizes, because servicemen of a foreign army stationed within the territory of any state, are not subject to the jurisdiction of the authorities of that state for violations of the law which may have been committed in the

line of duty. Actions like these, the message says, undermine the authority of the Lithuanian Republic in the international arena.

Uzbekistan Delegation To Visit Moldova, Baltics to Discuss Transfer of Servicemen

*92UM0973D Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
16 Apr 92 p 1*

[Article by R. Sagdiyev: "Where Are Uzbeks To Serve"]

[Text] A group consisting of people's deputies of Uzbekistan and representatives of the Ministry for Defense Affairs flew to the the Baltic and Transcaucasus republics, Moldova, and Ukraine. This is a step towards implementing the decree of the Presidium of the Republic's Supreme Soviet on recalling our fellow countrymen serving in those republics.

As was stated in the Tashkent Oblast Administration for Defense Affairs, talks have already been held on a possible exchange of servicemen between the sovereign states.

UKRAINE

Morozov on US Visit

*92UM0974C Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
24 Apr 92 p 1*

[Report by Lt Col Vasiliy Bilan: "High Level Discussion Produces Understanding: Ukraine Defense Minister Col Gen Konstantin Morozov Press Conference on Details of Visit to USA"]

[Text] Colonel General Konstantin Morozov informed representatives from all segments of the mass media that the visit he had made was in response to an official invitation extended by U.S. Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney. Included in the Ministry of Defense delegation were representatives of Ukraine's Parliament: Dmitriy Pavlychko, chairman of the Commission on Foreign Affairs, and Valentin Lemysh, acting chairman of the Commission on Defense and State Security. There was an expression of great satisfaction with our delegation's accomplishments, which had been offered the opportunity by the American side to take part - at this high level - in discussions of extraordinary importance: military policy of both the countries and an invitation to become familiar with the details of the educational procedures employed in the American Army, to include becoming acquainted with servicemen of all levels.

The accomplishments of the visit are viewed as an integral part of the process of establishing good relations between our countries. It is generally known that this kind of activity was initiated last year by Leonid Kravchuk when he at that time was serving as chairman of Ukraine's Supreme Council. This May the Ukrainian President will make a regular visit to the USA; the military delegation will also go, rendering this to some

extent a measure of a preliminary stage. The principal goal was to explain Ukraine's position on the major points of her military and political situation existing in and around Ukraine. Discussed in particular were criteria indicative of Ukraine's stability, with major emphasis placed on the leading aspect: the well-known results of last year's referendum on statehood independence of our country. Also in this category were an optimistic analysis of Ukraine's economic capabilities, and a clear statement of policy on her defense and construction of her own Armed Forces, including the issue of nuclear disarmament. Great importance attaches to good-neighbor policy with respect to CIS member states and other countries with whom we share our borders, something which unquestionably promotes stability in the area.

The defense minister reiterated Ukraine's position relative to nuclear weapons: The tactical variety as before is to be removed for destruction, with the difference that now this is to be done under international control. In the area of strategic nuclear weapons, our country insists that she be endowed with the status of an equal, relative to carrying out the requirements of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. With this as a basis, Ukraine's definite responsibility before the world community will enable her to fulfill the obligation she announced on her way to becoming a nuclear-free state. With the foregoing conditions satisfied, Ukraine would fulfill the stated obligation and sign onto the 1968 Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty.

During numerous meetings in the Pentagon, with the U.S. secretary of state, the advisor to the President, and with prominent statesmen, the delegation members presented their arguments for the need for a definite policy relative to Ukraine on the part of the leading world states in the military and political area, and for a policy of support stabilizing the political course taken by Ukraine. We openly stated our need for financial assistance. We listed the salient points of our military doctrine, which rejects the use of any force for the resolution of political, economic, or other problems.

Colonel General Konstantin Morozov made a presentation in which he stressed that consideration of Ukraine's situation relative to her policies has culminated in mutual understanding on the part of both sides; relative to the situation accruing as a result of the START agreement, there now are common views, specifically with respect to the need to seek a modern formula which would assist all states to bear responsibility before the world community, with an absence of difficulties relative to ratification of the Treaty. There was a statement of common interests in the search for a modern formula which would effectuate resolution of the conventional weapons problem. Ukraine is perceivable as an independent state, one which possesses her own Armed Forces and her own military policy; she is perceivable as a guarantor of stability in Eastern Europe. This lays a solid foundation for building mutual understanding between states at the new level.

In the area of practical questions, both sides have indicated their interest in aspects of the training of officers as carried out in schools in the USA, with exchange of groups of experts and advisors.

Did the discussions held during the visit touch on the question of international monitoring of nuclear arms withdrawal from Ukraine? Is this monitoring activity presently in effect?

The journalists were informed that the Presidents of Ukraine and Russia did sign the agreement, which states in specific terms the procedure to be followed for removing, storing, and destroying nuclear weapons, and for monitoring of all technological processes. Appended to the agreement is a provision specifying the monitoring to be carried out by a group of observers. The observers have been selected and their credentials drawn up; preparations are presently in progress.

One of the journalists cited the figure of 600,000 servicemen as having taken the oath of allegiance to the people of Ukraine, asking about the kind of future that the majority of them face, since the manpower figure set for the Armed Forces is 250,000 men.

The defense minister responded by saying that Ukraine set out to create her own Armed Forces in a democratic manner, and this at a time when there was no mention of a complete withdrawal of the former Soviet Army and creation of its own army. All the servicemen were considered to be citizens of Ukraine, with a full right to serve in her Armed Forces, regardless of ethnic origin. It has happened that the number of servicemen who took the oath is greater than that required for defense sufficiency of Ukraine. This is a natural process. And everyone knows that reduction in the Armed Forces is planned not only on the basis of our plan, but also that required by the Paris Treaty on Conventional Arms Limitation in Europe. People are aware of how the reduction is to be effected: largely by resolution of social problems, pensions and housing solutions, and the creation of conditions conducive to retraining of personnel. This being the case, there are no grounds for producing tension in military collectives.

Also not an object of neglect is the problem of the tense situation in the Dniester area and the possibility of a Ukrainian troop presence there. In his responses to a number of questions addressing this topic, Colonel General Konstantin Morozov said that he recently attended a working session with the defense ministers of Moldova, Rumania, and Hungary. However, questions related to specific aspects, such as the furnishing of a group of observers, did not come up for discussion, in the same manner as the absence of Ukraine's discussion of the issue of introducing Ukrainian troops into the Dniester area.

And, of course, why was the press conference not held in Moscow? Konstantin Petrovich in his answer to that question said that it was not he who made the decision to meet with journalists; the decision was made without

him. The visit's program included the preparation of a report on visit accomplishments by the Ukrainian President upon return to the Motherland. This report has been accomplished, such that now there is every indication of maintaining an open line of communication with journalists.

Our civilian colleagues also brought up the question of the military press. Army publications, as was correctly mentioned, were an object of a most powerful dictate on the part of political agencies, and they at times amounted to nothing less than servants of the Armed Forces, serving more or less as an arm of the same Main Political Directorate. What is to prevent a similar situation as far as the activity of Ukraine's military press is concerned, even though the Press Law prohibits things of this sort? - this being a question submitted by one of the journalists. He also expressed another quite interesting thought: A military newspaper should express the decisions of only the Defense Ministry Collegium and its leader - the minister - not of some particular structure.

Konstantin Petrovich explained his feelings about the military press as follows:

There are witnesses here who are aware that way back in the first few days, when the minister was the only person appointed to the command, we created the newspaper NARODNAYA ARMIYA. The latter ran into a great number of obstacles and pressures exerted from all sides, but the paper now lives and works. The military press - the same as any press - should be as democratic as possible. In my opinion, the military press should shape the moral and ethical spirit of the protectors of our Motherland - Ukraine. This work is extremely important, and it should manifest itself throughout the military press.

I accept all suggestions with pleasure. There unfortunately is a shortage of means to act on all of them. I have met with writers and journalists, and a great number of suggestions have been submitted for creating a military journal, newspapers, and other publications. We will create them at the earliest opportunity.

I will do what I can to see to it that the newspaper does not contain any one-sidedness or all those negative things as in the past. We are enjoying some success in this. In the first few days after my appointment, I found it necessary to stick my neck out, to exhibit quite a bit of audacity, so that I could dispel the atmosphere of the dictate and the atmosphere of the unilateral approach to events and processes. It was difficult. Credit is also due the collective of the newspaper NARODNAY ARMIYA.

Ukrainians Desert Poti Units

*92UM0969A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 16 Apr 92 p 3*

[Article by Nodar Broladze: "Flight of the Sailors: They Wanted to Serve on the Same Sea but in Another Navy."]

[Text] During the latest military operations involving government forces of the Georgian republic and allies of ex-president Zviad Gamsakhurdia, sailors fled from CIS Navy ships. This was reported by Captain Second Rank Nikolay Klepanchuk, assistant for personnel affairs to the commander of a brigade of ships. He said that two Ukrainian seamen—Dmitriy Mostepanenko and Dmitriy Ponomarenko—fled from their unit during military operations. While previously standing guard, Mostepanenko had been attacked and wounded. He returned to duty after medical treatment. In the opinion of Captain Klepanchuk, the reason for their desertion involves more than the complex and dangerous situation which has taken shape in Poti. They were following the political directives of the Ukrainian leadership. Klepanchuk said that if other Ukrainians follow their example, things will get very bad because many share this attitude. He then commented on Tengiz Kitovani's skilled leadership of National Guard personnel in Poti and stated that the assault against Poti did not directly concern sailors.

Pilots Request Service in Ukraine

92UM0966D Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
21 Apr 92 p 1

[Article by Capt D. Shkurko under the rubric "Echo of an Event": "Will the Native Land Greet Them Kindly?"]

[Text] A Tu-134 aircraft landed at the Borispol airfield at 18:44 on 16 April. There would have been nothing unusual about this occurrence, except....

The aircraft had delivered to Ukraine the families of military pilots now serving in the Republic of Poland, in the Northern Group of Forces. Worry about their future was added to the usual concerns of the planned move. One of the women told us that her husband, like all the other pilots, had been removed from flight status immediately after submitting a request to serve in Ukraine.

"They were issued their logbooks, blessed and told to go out and find whatever they could. Perhaps someone would give them a job in Ukraine, but they should not count on it. All the jobs there were taken long ago. At best, they will just give you less, and that will be the end of it. My husband came home beside himself after he was taken off flight status. I am no longer a pilot, mother.... I alone know what those words meant to him," I was told by one of the pilots' wives.

The same alarm over their impending fate could be heard in the words of literally every one of the women. Where would they live? Where would they work? They were comforted by only one thought: They would be home, in their native land, and it would not let them perish.

Maj Aleksandr Kharagichev, deputy squadron commander, was in a more optimistic mood. Whatever the

situation there, he had in his hands orders to report to one of the air units near Mirgorod to continue his service.

"We always had the opportunity to fly to Ukraine on short leaves to resolve personnel problems," he said. "Not everyone was lucky enough to 'acquire' these orders, however. There were many factors, the main one being the availability of housing. Some of us returned empty-handed. Around 20 men in our regiment alone."

How will the future of these people turn out?

For now the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine has allocated transportation to haul the families to the Kiev bus or railroad station, from where they will continue on to their friends and relatives to await their pilots, who will be withdrawn from Poland in a month. We wish them well!

Civilian Ground Troops Organize

92UM0966C Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
21 Apr 92 p 1

[Article by G. Kirey, deputy chairman of the Council of the Trade Workers' Union of the Ground Forces of Ukraine: "Provide Fair Wages"]

[Text] As previously reported, a conference of trade unions of workers of the armed forces of Ukraine will be held on 23 and 24 April 1992. It will elect the executive bodies and adopt a number of decisions.

Life itself is forcing the trade unions of the armed forces of Ukraine to unite and jointly accomplish the tasks involved in protecting the socioeconomic and labor interests of the multithousand-worker collectives of blue- and white-collar workers in the military.

Specifically, what does it mean to protect the socioeconomic and labor interests of the workers today? It means providing fair wages, finding work for those laid off, creating conditions at the work place which meet sanitation and medical requirements, providing legal protection for the labor rights of workers and observing social justice in the provision of housing, health protection, medical services, health restoration and rest for workers and their families.

One of the main focuses of our protective function at the present stage is that of ensuring fair wages. And the trade-union council always has this matter at the center of its attention.

Our demands are that the wages of blue- and white-collar workers of enterprises, organizations and establishments operating on a budget-estimate basis be paid wages approaching those of workers in the production branches and that the rates and salaries of blue- and white-collar workers of the armed forces be no lower than those of workers in similar occupations (positions) in civilian departments, establishments and organizations.

In fact the average monthly wage of blue- and white-collar workers of military units, establishments and organizations of the Kiev and Odessa military districts was 308 rubles in 1991, which was 132 rubles less than in Ukraine's civilian sector. Nor did the increase effected in accordance with Directive No. D-1 issued by the deputy minister of defense of Ukraine on 27 February 1992 do much, although its purpose was to bring the wage level for jobs at military units, organizations and establishments of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine into conformity with those of workers in related jobs in organizations and establishments of the civilian economy.

Judge for yourself. The average monthly wage for Ukraine's medical establishments in 1991 was 342 rubles and 1,510 rubles for the first quarter of 1992, while workers at military medical establishments belonging to the trade-union council earned 286 rubles in 1991 and 824 for the 1st quarter of 1992; workers in the Ministry of Public Education 345 rubles in 1991, 1,610 rubles for the first quarter of 1992; workers with military educational institutions, a corresponding 269 and 928; workers with state establishments, 341 rubles and 1,038 rubles. The figures were 296 and 610 rubles for workers at similar establishments of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine.

With respect to the low-paid categories of workers, their wages actually fell after recalculation under the aforementioned directive. This was established in the document itself, one of the points of which specifies payment of a corresponding difference in wages.

The lack of conformity of the wage level for workers of military units, enterprises, organizations and establishments of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine to the wage level for workers in the civilian sector is producing dissatisfaction and conflicts in the labor collectives, which is in turn generating a flood of complaints and allegations.

We therefore believe that we need to speed up the preparation of normative documents on wages for workers of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine in accordance with Decree No. 161 passed by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine on 31 March 1992.

BYELARUS

Troops Returning to Byelarus From 'Hot Spots'

*92UM0972B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 21 Apr 92 p 3*

[RIA article under the "From Minsk" rubric: "The First Group of Byelarusian Soldiers Has Returned Home"]

[Text] On 19 April 136 enlisted men and noncommissioned officers began carrying out their duties in units and subunits of the Byelarusian Military District. As was reported to an RIA correspondent at the headquarters of the Byelarusian Military District, they arrived by aircraft

on Saturday from Transcaucasia. In this manner, the decree of the Republic of Byelarus Supreme Soviet on the withdrawal of Byelarusian soldiers from "hot spots" of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia is being carried out. In the coming days all compulsory-service military men summoned from Byelarusian soil, numbering 1,606 people, will return from these regions to their native land.

Complications in Byelarusian Armed Forces Formation Viewed

*92UM0972D Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 28 Apr 92 pp 1-2*

[Article by Colonel G. Miranovich: "Not Yet Facing Off at the Front..."]

[Text] A new rubric—The National Army: View From Within

The process of the creation of their own armed forces by republics of the former USSR that have gained independence has become irreversible. By creating a new rubric, we wish to attempt to report objectively on the problems connected with this. What is happening in the armies that are coming into being? What are the starting points of their creators, taking as a basis this or that principle of military construction and adopting this or that program? What should be done so that relations between the armies of the independent states forming on the territory of the former Union will be built on the basis of cooperation? What should be done so that people's fates are not ruined by the birth of the new armies? We expect that all these questions interest our readers.

Notes on an army that does not yet exist

Even before this trip I was, of course, aware of how far the Republic of Byelarus had progressed in the construction of a military. Nonetheless, I was seeing it from the outside. Now...

I could not help, being in the Vitebsk area, traveling past my native village. How could I not stop in at the home of my parents? But there was an awkward moment—when the time came to say goodbye, my mother, even though she had reconciled herself long ago to the inevitability of our partings, suddenly began crying disconsolately. Neither Afghanistan nor Yugoslavia nor the "hot spots" of the CIS were awaiting me this time. What then did her watchful mother's heart sense? But she cried silently. It was only as I walked away that I heard: "But which army are you in now, my son?..."

Poor mothers, how much you are tormented today by this question, unheard among us since the time of the civil war! After all, the "militarization" of subjects of the CIS is still only in a rudimentary state. In any event, for the time being its wave reaches the rural depths of Byelarus only in the form of governmental decrees on military questions and tales of soldiers who have traveled home on leave or, more likely "on a food run." The

pilgrimages of "potential landowners," as some Moscow politicians are already presenting officers in expectation of military reductions, are not being felt here or, probably in other regions of the Commonwealth by reason of a lack of land and estates.

Meanwhile, conversing with people of various ages and nationalities one clearly sees that many are tormented by the thought, "What will happen in the future?" After all, even a child understands that a sovereign Byelarus cannot afford the "military possessions" of the Belorussian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] (72 intercontinental ballistic missiles, 10 combined-arms divisions, a separate PVO [Air Defense] army, an air force, and ground forces aviation). And of the 130,000 men in the Byelarusian Military District [BVO], according to Mechislav Grib, chairman of the republican parliamentary commission on questions of national security, defense, and the fight against crime, at best only a little more than 100,000 may remain in the near future. Over the long-term, as Lieutenant General Pavel Kozlovskiy, the new minister of defense, stated in his first speech in parliament, the number of personnel will be reduced to 90,000 men.

According to experts, Byelarus' draft potential—20,000 per draft—permits no more than 60,000 people to be kept under arms in peacetime. This contingent could be supplemented (the draft of the Law "On Universal Military Service Obligation and the Military Service" provides for this) by volunteers from among military reservists age 20 to 35. But it is difficult to say how many of them there will be and how much it will cost. It is only known for certain that the youth of Byelarus is not yet demonstrating special zeal for the ranks of a national force, whose formation began on 20 March. Moreover, as Colonel Anatoliy Levchenkov, chief of a department of the republican military command, told me, in Minsk and the oblast alone 1,500 or so youths are not appearing at draft stations when summoned.

One already notes difficulties with training of national officer personnel. Not so long ago the number of youths wishing to become students at the military service schools was over 3,000; today there are only 670 such people. Colonel Petr Moroz, assistant to the chief of the Suvorov school, said heatedly that the Minsk higher PVO surface-to-air missile engineering school used to accept only the best of the students from the Suvorov school; now it is accepting all who wish to go.

As concerns weaponry, Byelarus, according to existing data, claims 2,000 tanks, 2,500 armored vehicles, 1,700 artillery systems, 320 combat aircraft, and 130 helicopters. They are supposed to be used to equip the ground forces, air troops, PVO forces, and special purpose units that make up its army. According to the calculations of specialists, at current prices they have a value of 20 billion rubles.

In general, one's own army is a rather burdensome thing. But, judging by everything, this is precisely what the

initiators of its creation wanted. "It is not companies of honor guards that we need, but serious subunits"—this is what Lieutenant Colonel Nikolay Statkevich, one of the leaders of the movement for military security of the republic, said in the local press in September of last year. I do not know how serious these subunits should be from the point of view of the home-grown strategists. If one proceeds from foreign predictions with regard to possible wars and armed conflicts where a Byelarusian force together with a Russian force are assigned a role in fighting over the Baltic region against... NATO, then—pretty serious indeed.

However, let us return to our mathematics. Simple calculations demonstrate that however serious (at least from the point of view of financial expenditures) the created structure of the national army will be, they will not be able to absorb all the 44,000 officers presently serving in the BVO. At a minimum it will be necessary to reduce them by one-third. And of those (this has already been calculated for those who are interested), only one in six have a right to any sort of pension. And 2,000 do not currently have assignments. Another more than 40,000 native Byelarusians (there are only 5,000 of them in the officer staff of the district) are serving in various corners of the CIS and beyond its borders. Who knows how many of them will wish to finish their service on their native land? Or will travel here "by force of circumstances," as Colonel Vasiliy Bogachev did with me from Kiev, considering the oath of loyalty there personally unacceptable?..

The mathematics are not optimistic. Especially for those whose native land is also forming "its own" army. For Russians by birth, for example, who for the most part—almost 70 percent—make up the officer staff of the BVO.

Yes, the process of creating a national army in Byelarus is underway, one may say, without any special frictions. If one does not take into account, of course, the frictions in the parliament which, perhaps, are breaking the hearts of soldiers' mothers. Here no one is trying to privatize anything by "underhanded" means. Here there is nothing—and God grant, there will not be anything—similar to the tragedy of the Black Sea Fleet or the 14th army in the Dniester region. And, I believe, it is not just a result of the restraint that is characteristic of Byelarusians.

Officers and generals of the staff of the district are occupied in earnest, as they say, on all the calculations and, incidentally, on preparing drafts of legislative acts concerning questions of defense. A military ministry is also being formed on the basis of the district staff, headed by Lieutenant General Pavel Kozlovskiy, the former chief of that staff. Close cooperation between the most experienced military professionals and parliamentary structures and representatives of social movements of the republic is permitting the interested parties to find a common language on questions that have been considered insoluble for decades.

Until quite recently, for example, an attempt by some chairman of a kolkhoz or of a local soviet to negotiate with the army command on plowing up an unused training field for agricultural purposes would have been considered an insolent infringement on the holy of holies of a military department. But today? Major General Vasiliy Demidik, deputy district commander of combat training and the main manager of the training fields administration of the BVO, which is known for its scope and technical perfection, told me with satisfaction how he personally took part in the transfer to the republic of 19,600 hectares of land of the military department and, in the process, "did not lose one training field."

It turns out that in order to settle the longstanding problem of the "land question," it was enough to examine with a manager's eye the borders of the training fields: Taking into account the changing structures of the troops, the introduction into the training process of the newest technical equipment, and taking into account ecological and other factors, it was possible to cut back those borders in places. Without damage to the interests of combat training, of course.

"To be honest," admitted Vasiliy Vladimirovich, "we only legalized in a number of places that which had already existed secretly for a long time. Wherever the size of a training field was clearly too large, the peasants had already been using the empty land. But it was in secret and by stealth. Now everything is being done on a human level."

I listened to the combat general grown wise with experience, and I was struck with the thought: Is this not why Byelarus is creating its own army calmly and peacefully, so that everything connected with it is done as in this case, "on a human level"?

Nonetheless, the main difficulties are still to come. According to General Demidik, the new force will run up against them in the coming year when it will be necessary to finance combat training. The problem is that no one is financing it at present. The money that Byelarus is allotting for military expenses is only enough to pay for upkeep of the servicemen.

Nonetheless, combat training among the troops continues. Not as intensively as when our military might flourished, of course. Here is a report, characteristic of today's military workday routine, of the district press center on an exercise recently conducted by the command staff: "In conjunction with the need to economize on motor resources and monetary assets, the exercise took place in garrison without movement of staffs and administrative assets."

However the worst, believe the specialists, is still to come. For the time being only operational training is being conducted within the office, whereas personnel are not yet confined to their barracks. Two regimental exercises were conducted, as planned, in the winter period. One of them took place with combat fire. And that cost 1.5 million rubles. There are also enough reserves for the summer

period of training—on the day of my conversation with General Demidik, only 15 percent of the limit on shells prepared for the current year had been expended.

But what awaits combat training when the reserve has been fired and the equipment and machinery wear out? That is a question for the government and for the Byelarusian Ministry of Defense that is now being formed. The only thing, it seems to me, that one can say today with any certainty is that the Byelarusian Army, as well as the other armies of the former Soviet republics, can look forward to conditions of strict economy. Does that mean that there will be less window dressing and more sober accounting and consideration in plans and affairs? So much the better! But I was told how the anniversary of the Rogachev motorized rifle division (the troops still call it "the court's own") was recently celebrated. A sea of paint was used on decorations alone...

Ahead are also difficulties connected with reductions and movement of personnel. After all, at present there is no national army as such in Byelarus. There is a district that is international in terms of both staff and the character of tasks being resolved. Here in the training subunits they are training thousands of junior commanders and specialists intended for the armies of Russia, Ukraine, and a number of other states of the Commonwealth. More than a thousand such personnel are undergoing training beyond the borders of Byelarus. In the near future these and others will return to their countries for further service. The compulsory-service contingent in the district can be fully manned with citizens of Byelarus only after the 1993 spring call-up.

It is difficult to say what kind of officer staff the Byelarusian army will have before that time. It is clear only that Byelarus will not avoid the exchange of personnel with other states, which worsens even more the already difficult position of officers and their families. But that is a problem for the future, although not such a distant one. For now...

From the window of the garrison hotel where I am staying I have a good view of the installation of an automobile battalion. Only Byelarusians serve there. At the end of each day at an hour stipulated by the daily schedule, the battalion exits for an evening march. The soldiers, in measured stride, pass along the square with a song, and I hear: "We remember the sacred words 'Moscow is with us!' since the times of Borodin" ... The local boys sing well and amiably. And I feel calmer: It means that my native Byelarus is not yet facing off at the front...

Tactical Nuclear Weapons Out of Byelarus by 27 April

92UM0972A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
29 Apr 92 p 1

[Unattributed article: "Byelarus. 27 April"]

[Text] Byelarus is completely free of tactical nuclear weapons. The last railroad echelon with nuclear munitions was sent out of the republic on 27 April.

In the words of Lieutenant General Pavel Kozlovskiy, minister of defense of Byelarus, this fact again confirms that the declaration on state sovereignty, in accordance with which Byelarus will be a neutral nonnuclear state, is being strictly observed in the republic.

BALTIC STATES

Latvia's Navy Reinstated

92UNI284C Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 21 Apr 92 p 2

[Article by K. Markaryan from Riga: "The Sailors Have Joined the Latvian Riflemen"]

[Text] The Latvian Navy again exists. In truth, just with one unit.

Until recently, on patrol along the Baltic was a former civilian launch converted to a military vessel. Another two ships are soon to be added to this. According to the plans of the Latvian Ministry of Defense, a total of 35 vessels will make up the naval forces, including tugs, tankers and oil collectors...

But a portion of the specialists consider such a number of naval ships to be a waste. Thus, the Maritime Inspector for the Committee on Environmental Conservation G. Drunka feels that it scarcely makes any sense to consume 4 tonnes of diesel fuel a day in the symbolic control of frontiers, which could be carried out by one patrol boat. The fleet, in his opinion, should without fail be a nonmilitary one and be concerned, along with controlling frontiers, with monitoring and observing the environmental protection standards, eliminating the consequences of accidents, and rescue work.

CAUCASIAN STATES

Size, Cost of Georgia Armed Forces Reported

92UM0971B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 25 Apr 92 p 1

[Report by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Anatoliy Gordiyenko: "The Armor is Strong"]

[Text] Tbilisi—The numerical strength of Georgia's armed forces will be at least 20,000. This was reported at a press conference held by the administration of the republic's Ministry of Defense.

Lt Gen Levan Sharashenidze, minister of defense, reported that induction into the republic's armed forces will begin in May. The service term has been set at 18 months. VUZ students, youth in poor health and onlysons are not subject to the draft.

Two mechanized corps will form the backbone of the armed forces, one deployed in western, the second in eastern Georgia. A corps will be broken down into mechanized brigades, which will contain three mechanized battalions,

an artillery battalion and a separate tank battalion. Georgia will now have its own border troops, its own air force and navy. With respect to the naval forces, Gen Sharashenidze noted that Georgia naturally does not plan to ignore the problem of the Black Sea Fleet.

We shall certainly join in the talks between Russia and Ukraine, the general said. And we shall lay claim to part of the fleet. Among other things, we want the Poti Naval Base to be placed under republic jurisdiction.

At the press conference a lot of attention was devoted to the formation of the Georgian army's officer corps. The stress was on officers who served until recently or are still serving in the CIS forces. All indications are that those 380 cadets now completing their studies at higher educational institutions in other republics of the former USSR will also return to Georgia. In addition, serious thought is being given to the possibility of training officers abroad.

We know that an army is an expensive indulgence for any country. Georgia is no exception. This figure was mentioned at the press conference: It costs at least 600 million rubles [R] to maintain just one mechanized brigade with a numerical strength of 5,000 men. And this does not include the cost of weapons and equipment.

From all indications, Georgian soldiers will live as well, perhaps better than they would live as civilians. It is planned to spend R45 a day on each soldier just for food.

Another thing we should point out is that Georgia has declared it will not become a member of any military blocs or alliances. For now. Perhaps never.

The leaders of the military department also showed the reporters a drawing of the combat banner for the republic's armed forces. It will be the same color as the state flag of Georgia: cherry, black and white.

CENTRAL ASIAN STATES

Tajikistan Announces Military Policy

92UM0973C Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 25 Apr 92 p 3

[Unattributed Article: "Tajikistan"]

[Text] "Tajikistan has no enemies, but the military danger has not been eliminated completely," stated Major-General Farukh Niyazov, chairman of the republic's Defense Committee, on pages of NARODNAYA GAZETA.

Tajikistan does not plan to create its own army; however, the republic has its own military doctrine. The main task of this doctrine is to ensure the republic's security against a threat from the outside, namely prevention of military conflicts and armed protection of the republic's sovereignty and integrity.

It is known that the other day President Rakhmon Nabiyev was appointed commander in chief of all troops on the

territory of Tajikistan, receiving the rank of colonel-general. At the same time, the CIS Armed Forces are operating in the republic under the orders of Marshal Shaposhnikov.

Uzbekistan to Recall Soldiers From Other Republics
*92UM0970B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 29 Apr 92 p 3*

[Article from RIA: "In May Uzbekistan Will Recall Many Servicemen Drafted From the Republic."]

[Text] All servicemen drafted from Uzbekistan and serving in republics that have not joined the CIS or that are building their own armed forces will be recalled home in mid-May. This was addressed in a message from Uzbekistan's Ministry of Defense Affairs transmitted via republican radio. Returning soldiers will be sent to man units of the Turkestan Military District or, should they desire, will enroll in alternative service. Those who have completed their service obligations will be discharged into the reserves.

DEFENSE INDUSTRY

Shulunov, Shibayev: Arms Trade As Salvation of Defense Industry

92UM0960A Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI
in Russian 17 Apr 92 p 3

[Article by Aleksey Shulunov, president, League of Russian Defense Enterprises; and Vladimir Shibayev, deputy minister, Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations of Russia: "How to Deal in Arms?"]

[Text] A Producer's View

Developers and producers of military equipment should receive their share of revenues from exports, in the opinion of Aleksey Shulunov, president of the League of Russian Defense Enterprises.

Precipitous conversion has left the majority of defense complex enterprises devoid of the funds necessary for existence. Money which has been allotted for purchase of military equipment has not yet arrived at enterprises. Banks adamantly refuse to give defense any credit. Many plants have not paid out any salaries in two months.

In a word, the defense complex finds itself in a catastrophically poor financial situation. Under these conditions, if only internal forces are to be employed, it is necessary to look at new possibilities for arms trade, for arms export.

Specialists estimate that the demand for weapons produced by our domestic industry may amount to 12 billion dollars to 16 billion dollars in this year, while in 1993 the amount may attain 25 to 30 billion dollars. However, these possibilities are not yet being tapped; arms exports are experiencing a noticeable drop. Weapons exports should be subject to state supervision, of course. In this connection, negotiations should include the developers of weapons and military equipment themselves. The situation is still such that we, the developers and producers, cannot engage in technical servicing or modernization of equipment already in the hands of foreign countries, either independently, or under the control of the state. It obviously makes sense to permit producers to engage in this work under license issued by the state.

The granting of leeway in arms exporting to enterprises would enable them to resolve their own financial problems and accelerate the processes of conversion. The League of Defense Enterprises has drafted a proposal for setting up a conversion fund, the income for which would be provided by a 5-percent deduction from arms export revenue. The fund's assets would be utilized to purchase advanced technologies and equipment for application in enterprises undergoing conversion.

The Ministry Opinion

Vladimir Shabayev, deputy minister of Foreign Economic Relations of Russia, urges avoidance of a crude, mercenary approach.

Here we are operating on the assumption that it is all right to have arms trade. The moral aspect of the problem has been discussed quite a number of times, both here in our country, and in foreign countries. Nonetheless, world commerce with this type of commodity not only has not shown a decrease but actually has grown. As far as we are concerned, military exports are a substantial component of Russia's foreign economic relations, one accounting for this trade with 45 countries of the world. This is particularly true in the demand for our aviation, armor, and small arms. It is sufficient to say that military items constitute a considerable portion of machine-building products headed for foreign markets. These sales for many years have provided substantial amounts of foreign exchange for the state budget. Sales for the last five years have brought in the equivalent of 41 billion dollars, including about 12 billion to the SKV [Expansion unknown]; 5 billion dollars in last year alone.

In this connection, our country in this area avoids following an abject mercenary policy, instead taking into consideration moral, humane, ethical, political, and other factors common to civilized humanity. Arms deals should not be detrimental to the political and defense interests of the country, nor should they violate any particular resolutions made by the U.N. or international treaties. This includes prohibitions on the selling or supplying of armaments, be they nuclear, chemical, or mass destruction types.

Overseeing the above is the Governmental Interdepartmental Commission on Military Technical Cooperation with Foreign Countries, which is headed by Yegor Gaydar. Russia is in strict compliance with the principles governing conventional armaments that were announced at the London meeting of permanent members of the U.N. Security Council held in October of 1991. We obligated ourselves to observe those rules by not selling weapons to Angola, Afghanistan, Iraq, Cambodia, the UAR, Yugoslavia, and other countries. We put a virtual stop to offering military cooperation to Nicaragua, and effected a significant decrease in cooperation to Cuba, Laos, Vietnam, Mongolia, Yemen, and the DPRK. There could be changes in the foregoing list, of course, depending upon the military and political situation.

A draft law, slated for completion by the end of the year, deals with the subject of technical military cooperation between Russia and foreign governments. It will embody a clear statement of the "rules of the game." However, even now there is no doubt that the arms trade should be subject to close state supervision. Nonetheless, attempts are being made to weaken the control or even eliminate it in the area of arms sales. These attempts are promoted by manufacturers of weapons and military equipment, and by allied organizations which ordinarily have nothing to do with this kind of activity.

GENERAL ISSUES

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However, it is one thing to manufacture an item and another to possess the skill to deal in it, while complying with Russian and international requirements. In this connection, certain enterprises have managed to be granted permission to engage in weapons sales, while other enterprises are petitioning for authorization to sell not only munitions, tractors, and training aircraft, but a nuclear-powered heavy guided missile cruiser, as well.

They evidently are undertaking such action by force of circumstances. It is a fact that the end of the "cold war" has brought about a slump in the world's military market. Exporting countries have suffered reverses. This is especially true for our highly militarized industry. The industry's state orders have decreased by a factor of 6 to 8. What is to be done with the quantities of materiel that are piling up?

Even with the above in mind, I remain skeptical about the idea of representatives of the military-industrial complex permitting manufacturers to conduct an arms trade on their own. We have had a sad experience with machine-building exports: excessive liberalization in this area resulted in our losing tens of billions of dollars. In this connection, in the USA it is not permitted for five American companies to sell fighters to the same country. The companies are required to compete among themselves within the continental United States.

The loss of some of our traditional markets has motivated us toward an active search for new partners in Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Latin America. The point here is that the international arms market has already been divided up to a great extent, and a retreat from positions already won would be unwise. As far as the former republics of the Union are concerned, the only thing that may be said is that the CIS was established in December of 1991, and any discussion of arms deals with its member countries would be premature. Under discussion are requests that have been received from the Baltic states. Clearly, any deals concluded with them must offer a mutual advantage.

The domestic and foreign press publishes quite an amount of facts and figures on the arms trade. My argument is that all the information provided contains inaccuracies, with much of the data taken from sources of doubtful veracity. The underlying cause of this is that, in spite of the new military export philosophy, it is permissible to sell everything that is not prohibited; weapons always were and continue to be too sensitive an item, and trade in this commodity involves the interests of too many countries. All information pertaining to the selling and supplying of weapons is highly confidential.

Current State of Murmansk Ship Repair Facility

*92UM0948A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
14 Apr 92 First Edition p 2*

[Article by Sr Lt V. Fatigarov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "There Is a Yard for Repairing the Supercruisers. In the North of Russia. But It Itself Has Run Aground Financially"]

[Text] KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has turned more than once to the problems of ship repairs in the Navy and these have been exacerbated by the fact that a portion of the ship repair yards (SRZ) has been turned over to the sovereign republics. A particularly severe situation has developed with the overhauling of the heavy aircraft carrying cruisers [TAKR] of the Kiev class and built at the Black Sea Ship Building Yard. Indicative in this regard is the fate of the TAKR Minsk and about which the newspaper has recently written ("So Perish the Ships on the Ruins of the Union," 25 Mar 92). Under the existing situation its overhaul in Ukraine is unrealistic. The restless cruiser has been turned into a sort of "Flying Dutchman" or ghost ship. At the same time Russia does have a yard capable of returning the largest naval ships to technical readiness. Does this mean that there is no problem? Our correspondent visited the Murmansk SRZ headed by Capt 1st Rank V. Miroshnichenko.

The Deputy Yard Production Chief, Capt 2d Rank V. Zotov is convinced that the plant would be able to provide repair work for the giant ships.

"In essence, in Russia only we can repair the large-tonnage cruisers of the Kiev class," said Vladimir Anatolyevich [Zotov]. "We are in the stage of completing a block of special production shops and we only have to connect the utilities. But according to the plan the financing for the enterprise is to be reduced by 11 percent, while in actuality the SRZ is getting ready at best for a 50 percent reduction in money. In line with this, naturally, the orders from the general client are being reduced. Highly skilled specialists are beginning to depart. As of today, 687 persons employed in the production sphere have left the yard, and 747 of the so-called nonproduction workers."

Incidentally, there is an analogous situation at the other Navy enterprises in the Arctic. For instance, at the military plant where Capt 2d Rank S. Litvinenko is the chief, because of the significant increase in the cost of materials and the higher wages for maintaining at least a minimum standard of living for the employees, the funds allocated for the quarter had been used up in the first six weeks. Since 26 February, production has been halted at the plant.

Naturally the leadership of the Murmansk SRZ is not waiting for a change in the wind, and it is actively searching for ways to maintain production by orders. The yard has established the positions of deputy commercial chief and deputy production chief for marketing. A plan of proposals has been worked out to stabilize the enterprise's production operations under the conditions of market relations. The SRZ has begun to receive orders for the repair of civilian vessels. But this will not be for long. Recently in a television appearance by the chief of the Murmansk Trawling Fleet, the figure of 30,000 was mentioned. This is the number of persons they plan to cut back due to the shortage of funds at the production association.

Within the collective of the Murmansk Yard, the idea is at work of replacing the military positions with civilian ones, including, for example, the post of production chief, as well as issuing and selling stock for the yard and converting it to the private property of the stockholders. How do the military feel about this prospect? Not without reason they feel that the privatization of the yard, should it happen, would inevitably involve the respecializing of this unique enterprise.

"This would be another yard with other tasks and other problems. But we are talking about maintaining the only yard in the Russian Federation which is capable of overhauling the superlarge tonnage naval ships," I was told by one of the SRZ leaders.

It is possible to understand both sides, both the military and the civilian. But only one choice must be made. Those who are inclined in favor of the interests of the defense of Russia feel that for completely resolving the questions of the overhaul of the Navy ships and vessels, and above all the heavy cruisers, it is essential, in the first place, to work out an overall plan for the national-state interests of the Russian Federation at sea and determine the specific tasks which are to be carried out by the Navy. Proceeding from this plan, the naval forces and the Navy's structure should be set. Secondly, we must establish the actual combat readiness, the necessary technical state of the ships and vessels, the actual funds to be allocated for repairs and the sequence of these. Thirdly, we must clearly define the structure of ship repairs and without fail, the amounts of their state financing (incidentally, at present a significant portion of this very financing is returned to the budget in the form of taxes. As KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has already written, from each 100 million rubles [R] allocated, some 45 million go for taxes).

For now the yard is complaining of the weak activities on the part of the client in the person of the Technical Directorate of the Northern Fleet. The military shrug their shoulders as there is no money for orders.

Possibly, because certain naval officials still cannot get free of the chain-of-command style in dealing with others, the leaders of the naval ship repair and other defense enterprises, as has been learned from reliable sources, in the search for a way out, have turned to the head of the Murmansk Oblast Administration with a proposal to take measures to ensure the stability of their jobs under the conversion conditions. On this question, a decision was taken on the withdrawal of the designated enterprises from the existing management structures (that is, the Navy, first of all) and the creation of a state concern of oblast ship repair enterprises.

Possibly, we are seeing sketched out before us the prototype of firms working in the sphere of the military business for the defense of the state. But this is in the future. At present the cruiser Minsk is waiting to take its place at the yard's pier. Will it have a long time to wait? Already in the yard are its "confreres," the carrier

cruisers Admiral Flota Sovetskogo Soyuza Gorshkov and Kiev. At one time the ships of this class were the pride of our Navy, and they made possible the successor Admiral Flota Sovetskogo Soyuza Kuznetsov. At present there is the threat that the cruiser Kiev will be decommissioned. After two years of overhauls and R5 million of investment, the work on the pioneer has bogged down due to the lack of funds. Plans are being hatched to transfer a portion of the equipment from the Kiev to the Gorshkov in order that the yard could complete at least one of the ships.

It is hard to believe that the colossal amounts of money can be spent on building this series of cruisers only to scrap them 10 years later! Can we maintain what we create?

With a bitter feeling I left one of the largest ship yards in Russia, realizing that the solution to the problems of the modern Navy depended largely upon a state solution to the yard's problems.

MILITARY CONFLICT, FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

Scenarios for Eastern European Conflict, Implications for Ukraine

92UM0964A Kiev GOLOS UKRAINY in Russian
No 73, 21 Apr 92 p 6

[Article by Historian, Political Scientist Dmitry Tabachnik: "Is the 'Ukraine' Group of Armies Attacking? Or Are Military Conflicts Possible in Eastern Europe?"]

[Text]

Point of View

The elaboration of all possible variations of the emergence and the painstaking analysis of the course of events and the consequences of all possible—both local and strategic—military conflicts which will affect or only touch upon the interests of the state (even if these conflicts for the time being have hardly noticeable hypothetical contours) is, without any exaggeration whatsoever, one of the most important functions of the higher political and military leadership of all states. Wise Romans have already said: "If you want peace, prepare for war." And this is not just a popular expression—it contains profound wisdom that has been accumulated through centuries of state building, the wisdom of the preservation of the state, the experience that consists of the fact that the better a country prepares for war, the greater it guarantees that it will never end up in the fire of its neighbors' aggressive encroachments.

Here in Ukraine very much is being said about the need to enter the world community and about integration into European political and economic structures. But for now no one is directly involved with either the elaboration of a serious pro-European policy or its priorities and state

strategic defensive concept, with the problem of Ukraine's strategic alliances, or with agreements on collective security, etc. Unfortunately, the matter is not progressing beyond conversations and declarations, desires and the adoption of a package of quite imperfect and incomplete laws on domestic military structural development. It is difficult to hide the presence of such an alarming and, let's be frank, unsafe situation—even meetings of Ukraine's highest governmental figures with NATO Secretary General M. Woerner have been limited to just protocol courtesies.

Previously, Ukraine did not need strategic military forecasts—Moscow and analysts at the General Staff and the Main Intelligence Directorate did the thinking for us. And this was the strategy of a superpower that had its imperial interests everywhere. Today the situation is quite different. And Ukraine needs to independently foresee and predict.

What strategic and military-political predictions of immediate events in Eastern Europe—until 1994—are NATO's best analysts providing? What is Ukraine's immediate future as seen by Western military scholars who, in contrast to native military scholars, are not so competitively examining the development of the systemic catastrophe in the former Soviet Union while considering the entire complex of causes and not only some sort of declaration of independence or nonalignment.

It is extremely difficult to predict and to foresee the development of strategic-military changes and conflicts between the former countries of the socialist commonwealth (I have in mind both the former Warsaw Pact Bloc and the former USSR). But it is worth noting that neither acute political contradictions, nor an undisguised political confrontation as, for example, today between Ukraine and Russia, or even the horrible economic chaos in the CIS are at the center of the attention of foreign analysts' and political scientists' scientifically-predicted studies. The main theme of their efforts which have been directed at the "calculation" of events in advance—is the strategic military consequences of the process of "secession" of the former Soviet republics. Recently, in February 1992, the leader of France's Ministry of Defense scientific research center warned that these will be "processes that do not have any similarities in the history of mankind and which pose an extreme threat to stability in Europe."

The issue of security in Europe is being examined by NATO scholars and analysts in the closest connection with the processes of the expansion of the contradictions between the former allies-Eastern European countries with the distribution of the USSR's strategic military potential and the creation of the national armies of the new independent states among which contradictions will also arise. According to Western European experts, Ukraine unfortunately occupies a central place in practically all possible conflict scenarios, including armed conflicts.

NATO's highly skilled professionals consider the development of events along several primary scenarios to be possible. They orient their governments and the highest circles of military leadership in such a way so that their actions turn out to be maximally adequate to the situations which may arise.

Scenario No. 1. The CIS countries (primarily Russia, Ukraine, Byelarus, and Moldova) or one of them becomes involved in conflicts in Eastern Europe that are associated with territorial disputes or with acute ethnic contradictions. They cite a conflict between Romania and Hungary in which Moldova and Ukraine may become involved or a conflict between Poland and Germany in which Byelarus or Ukraine could become involved as possible examples...

Scenario No. 2. This is a question of the Eastern European countries or one of them becoming involved in a conflict among the CIS member-states as a result of the support of ethnic minorities. The possibility of a clash between Moldova and Russia and Romania's subsequent interference in this conflict is most often cited as an example. Ukraine can also be dragged into a conflict as a buffer between Moldova and Russia.

This scenario can become especially realistic if the current leadership of the Republic of Moldova attempts to use force to resolve the problem of the Left Bank of the Dniester. Then, Western political scientists think that a military armed conflict with the unrecognized Dniester Republic is inevitable and the Ukrainian Army, while crossing the official Moldovan border and inevitably clashing with Moldovan armed formations, will come to the defense of the Ukrainian population. The Romanians will definitely rush to assist the Moldovans.

Scenario No. 3. The essence of this prediction-scenario consists of the fact that a large-scale armed conflict in Eastern Europe can arise in the event that possible clashes or combat operations among Commonwealth member-states spread to the Eastern European countries. While examining this variation in role analysis, scholar-analysts from the NATO Secretariat have modeled and played out three outlines of the development of events which will have identically tragic consequences.

The first outline: The Eastern European countries (Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia) use military force to halt massive, and possibly uncontrollable, emigration from the CIS member-states. But this emigration is an absolutely realistic prospect if the economic collapse deepens, expands, or reaches the level of destruction of the primary production units which today are enterprises. Armed formations from the CIS will become involved in combat operations while defending their own emigrating citizens.

The second outline of this variation: As a result of serious, prolonged, and large-scale conflicts among the independent countries that compose the CIS and the military formations or units of the national army of a state that has suffered defeat and is retreating onto the territory of

the Eastern European countries, thus drawing them into the armed conflict. These events may become a reality if we imagine a conflict or combat operations between Moldova or Ukraine or, say, between the Russian Federation and Ukraine. The defeated military formations of Moldova in the first case, or Ukraine—in the second case, retreat accordingly into Romania or into Poland. And these peaceful countries are drawn into the armed confrontation.

The third outline: NATO's experts also consider the third outline to be just as possible but with one serious adjustment to the situation of the emergence of a military conflict within the CIS. This conflict is not between Commonwealth member-states but between one or several states, on the one hand, and the CIS Allied Armed Forces, on the other hand. One of the CIS member-countries, that wants to destroy or bleed white a competitor not with its own forces but with the might of the CIS Armed Forces—the latter still even now a vital structure of the former USSR, can also act against one of its neighbors with the assistance of the Allied Armed Forces or in a military alliance with them.

And finally, **Scenario No. 4.** This forecast of the development of events is hypothetical in nature for the time being. But with a certain development of circumstances, its "remoteness" can rapidly disappear and it can be transformed from a forecast for the remote future into a tactical forecast which is realized in several years. Its main conclusion is as follows: the disintegration and destruction of the CIS and the collapse of the existing structures of power under the condition of the still uncertain military-political weakness of the former republics in combination with anti-Russian sentiments will result in the fact that the Eastern European countries attempt to obtain, if not Russia's support, then at least its neutrality and seize the former Polish, Hungarian, Czechoslovakian, or Romanian territories that are currently part of Byelarus, Moldova, or Ukraine.

It is interesting to stress that NATO analysts and military experts assess conflict scenarios 2, 3, and 4 in Eastern Europe as most probable in the 1990's. So, NATO is already preparing—all variations of the development of events without exception envision the interference of its armed forces, structures and mechanisms in the conflicts at some stage or other of their development. There is one goal for the interference: to resolve these conflicts in such a way as to totally guarantee the protection of the European security of NATO's military and also political interests.

Thus, multifaceted elaborations of all possible variations of the future development of events in Eastern Europe and in the European portion of the USSR, which directly affect Ukraine's state, military and political interests, its security and the prospects of its existence as an independent state, are being carried out and seriously financed at NATO's highest echelons of power and at its military-political research centers.

It is difficult and maybe even immoral in some people's opinions to talk about and analyze the prospects of combat operations in which Ukraine may become involved. All the more so if it is a question of its immediate neighbors. But as an example, let us recall the activities and policy of the Swiss Confederation government which already has not fought anyone for three centuries and does not intend to do that, but still has plans to repel attacks both from France, Germany, and from Italy. And all of this does not impede it from being one of the most peace-loving countries. The issue of state security is too serious for it only to be examined from the point of view of a country's external reputation or while considering only the promises of its neighbors. You cannot brush off the reality of the contradictions between Ukraine's interests and those of the countries surrounding it. Are Ukraine's politicians and military personnel ready to provide the guaranteed security and reliable defense under any development of events? Is the intellectual potential that has been concentrated on the solution of these problem serious? There is some doubt in this regard.

SECURITY SERVICES

Byelarus To 'Coordinate' Border Troops With CIS

92UM0972C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 21 Apr 92 p 2

[Interview with Major General Ye. Bocharov, chief of the Main Directorate of Border Forces under the Council of Ministers and commander of Border Forces of the Republic of Byelarus, by Colonel P. Chernenko under the "Firsthand" rubric; place and date not given: "There Should Be a Unified Approach to Defense of the Borders of the CIS"]

[Text] From the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA dossier. Bocharov, Ye.M., born 1948, in the military since 1966. Graduated from the Ryazan Higher Airborne Command School. He also graduated from the Military Academy imeni M.V. Frunze and the General Staff Military Academy. He has served in airborne troops in various command positions. His last post was commander of the Vitebsk Airborne Division. He served three and a half years in Afghanistan.

[Chernenko] My first question, Yevgeniy Mikhaylovich, is connected with the creation of the Main Directorate of Border Forces under the Council of Ministers of Byelarus...

[Bocharov] The creation here of a Main Directorate of Border Forces is a consequence of an agreement between the states of the Commonwealth on a common defense for borders. We will have complete coordination of actions with the Border Forces of the CIS. Over the long-term there should be a unified approach to defense of the borders of the CIS. We created the Main Directorate of Border Forces even though we were advised from Moscow to create a committee for defense of state

borders with extensive rights and a broadened staff. But, after weighing everything, we came to the conclusion that such a committee was not needed. True, it will be difficult to function given the number of officers presently on the staff of the directorate and the equipment allotted to us. But I am convinced that we will be able to handle the tasks set for us.

[Chernenko] You are the commanding officer of Border Forces of Byelorussia. What do they consist of at present?

[Bocharov] Border Forces of our republic consist of a portion of the men and equipment of the former Western Border District, which was located on the territory of Byelorussia and was directed by the command group Byelorussia located in Minsk. It is on the basis of that group that our directorate is created in practice. The Border Forces of Byelorussia consist of detachments of border forces, border control detachments, and special units for service and supply. There are plans to create a border forces aviation. As soon as accords are concluded with Lithuania and Latvia on the establishment of a state border, our forces will be enlarged by two or three detachments.

[Chernenko] Between the states of the CIS there are "transparent" borders, as the president of Russia put it. What is Byelorussia's border with Lithuania and Latvia like right now?

[Bocharov] In the Agreement on Defense of State Borders of the CIS it is defined that the borders with Lithuania and Latvia will be the same as with the rest of the states of Europe. It is difficult to say what the border will be like. There are several variants, they have been presented to the government, and it will decide. I believe the following: Byelorussia's border with Lithuania and Latvia should be the same as with Poland, but taking into account the realities of the present day. It should not be forgotten that we used to live in a single state with the Baltic republics and we are tied by many decades of close cooperation. It is not worth artificially creating additional barriers on that border.

[Chernenko] Have there been any changes on the border in conjunction with the reassignment of the Border Forces to the jurisdiction of the Council of Ministers of Byelorussia?

[Bocharov] There have been practically no changes. In principle there should not be any. The forces have remained the same, and the same tasks as before are being carried out. There have only been changes in the organs of the directorate.

[Chernenko] Yevgeniy Mikhaylovich, you are a member of the airborne. And suddenly—the Border Forces...

[Bocharov] How did I end up in the Border Forces and why? Yes, I served in the airborne forces, and it is understandable that I have some gaps in special border training for now. I emphasize that—for now. But that will come with time. At the same time, one cannot say that I know nothing of border matters. I have already

served in these forces two and a half years, when the Vitebsk division was a part of the Border Forces of the KGB. We defended the state border in Azerbaijan, a portion of about 300 kilometers. Later we performed the same task in other regions. Thus, I believe I have acquired a certain experience.

Kazakhstan's Alpha Anti-Terrorist Unit Profiled

*92UM0971A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
25 Apr 92 p 4*

Article by Col A. Ladin under the rubric "A Matter for Real Men": "President Nazarbayev's Special-Purpose Troops"]

[Text] Kazakhstan. The dusty, sleepy town of Chiili. Midday. The bus station. The passengers are taking their seats. Suddenly....

"Sit down everyone! You are all hostages! Hostages! Don't even breath, scum! We'll kill anyone who tries anything!"

A baby began to cry and choke. A book fell noisily out of someone's hands. The Ikarus passengers grew limp, their faces paled.

Everyone understood at once that these two—unshaven, dressed in black, heads shaved bald—were real animals. It was terrifying. It seemed to every passenger that he could make out the tiniest scratch on the pistol muzzle. And none of them needed a news report or a resume to realize that if no one came to their assistance, these two would shoot the entire cabin. God help them, have mercy and keep them safe. Were they going to be left to the mercy of fate?

It was so terrible both for the hostages and for those engaged in negotiating with the criminals, the thought kept gnawing away in their minds that perhaps the demands of the bandits would be met, that they would be provided with money and a plane. There was nothing they could do. They still had one hope though; that members of the legendary Alpha special-purpose troops would fly into Chiili in time. This was that same famous subunit for combatting terrorism which had until recently been a part of the USSR KGB. Now the Alpha subunit based at Alma-Ata is directly under the president of Kazakhstan.

The alarm had barely gone out, when the Alpha team took off for the site. In the meantime, in order to lull the bandits, the bus carrying the hostages was allowed to pass through to the airfield at Chimkent.

During that time the team's "brain center" had calculated what it would take to free the hostages. The special-purpose troops located the Ikarus at Chimkent and set up a capture position (intercept site) so that it resembled one selected in the area of the airfield and

began running through drills, one after the other, adding more and more psychological aspects to work on the nerves of the criminals.

The seizure operation was directed by Lt Col Aleksandr Vorotnikov (for obvious reasons not his real name). The strongest, most proficient and quick-reacting men were positioned at the forward line of the assault. These fellows can hit a target with any kind of weapon, from even the most disadvantageous position. And they never miss. A spot where the bus would have to brake was selected for the capture. The plan was for the criminals to see through the cockpit window a plane parked a few meters away, the ladder ready and the crew standing by. Seeing this, they would almost certainly relax their intensity.

And that is what happened. The Ikarus rolled out onto the lifeless runway. It moved closer and closer. It braked. Suddenly the bus took a powerful blow from somewhere (it was struck by a snowplow concealed behind a building). Everyone in the cabin lurched forward, thrown from their seats. Simultaneously there was a blinding flash, a deafening sound, glass broken to smithereens. Men flew through the bus windows as though shot from a canon. It took only five seconds. Both terrorists were killed.

There were ten such operations last year. And this figure represents people's lives saved, large sums of money, weapons and drugs seized, and much more. Alpha does not engage in simple operations. People turn to it when professionals and supermen are needed, when the situation involves the elite of the criminal world.

The Alpha guys are actually just ordinary fellows, however. They also take their bruises and injuries. More terrible than the wounds, however, are the problems which, unfortunately, are accumulating. Alpha needs modern communication equipment, individual protective gear, high-speed vehicles and special weapons enabling them to carry out their specific and complex missions.

They do not complain. No, they are not that kind of people. They do hope, however, that the subunit will receive assistance, particularly from the republic government. And what about the men? The men will be found. The KRASNAYA ZVEZDA press center frequently receives inquiries from little boys and strong young men about how they can join Alpha, and what kind of people it accepts. We cannot describe the Alpha men in detail. The specific nature of their work does not allow it. We do know, however, that they have all gone through a very rigid psychological, moral and special screening process. Not just anyone can join. But who are these people? There are former engineers and teachers on the team. One Alpha member was even training to become a forester. He became an anti-terrorist specialist instead.

Our interview with the Alpha people did not last long. The alarm went off, and they set out once again. We expressed our hope that they would return safe and

sound, which is what their wives and children, those near and dear and people who do not even know them wish them every day.

Ukrainian Security Uncovers Arms Dealers

92UM0968A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
21 Apr 92 p 2

[Article by Vladimir Fomenko: "Weapons Rental Point"]

[Text] Agents of the Kharkov Security Service uncovered a group of criminals dealing in weapons.

A combined group of agents from the Ukrainian Security Service and the Inter-regional Department of Organized Crime approached a three-story, detached house on the outskirts of the city. The building was notable in that besides having the traditional living conveniences, it also turned out to have a swimming pool, greenhouse and storeroom for various goods. An underground arsenal was discovered. What is more, it was not simply an arsenal. In fact, a weapons rental point was being run in the house.

It is reasoned that a customer with a well-based recommendation would arrive, name the type of weapon desired, pay money and receive what he was looking for. During the search, various types of assault rifles, shotguns, Mausers, small-caliber rifles, grenades and much more were removed. The rental fees were entirely acceptable to the customers because these people live in another dimension of prices, from the majority of citizens. For example, it was necessary to pay five thousand rubles for a day's use of a submachinegun bearing the famous Israeli brand name "Uzi." Cartridges for a Makarov pistol sold for five rubles.

Whence such abundance! The investigation revealed a number of sources. Pistol cartridges, for example, were received through a serviceman of one of the Kharkov military schools. Contact with the Georgian city of Borzhomi was to be very promising for the criminals. They had received grenades from there and were expecting a shipment of Kalashnikov assault rifles.

The investigation has been completed. The criminal operators have been convicted, but questions extending beyond the limits of the criminal case remain. Today the criminal world is well armed. The number of crimes involving weapons is growing. What are law-abiding citizens to do? Time and again our correspondent posed this question to police officials of various ranks.

Security Service Personnel Face Housing Shortages

92UM0966A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
22 Apr 92 p 1

[Report by NARODNAYA ARMIYA correspondent under the rubric "In the Ukrainian Security Service": "There Are Fewer Secrets"]

[Text] Just recently this building on Vladimirskaia was an impregnable fortress. It was impossible to get into the building, the republic's former KGB. Today this "fortress" has been taken. What is more, strange as it seems, it was taken with the help of those inside. Yes, the doors of what is now the Ukrainian Security Service have been opened with the help of its management.

Here is a quite recent example. A press conference was held by Yevgeniy Marchuk, chairman of the SBU [Ukrainian Security Service] and other individuals from that department. It was essentially a six month activity report. I would mention the fact that the service was established under a decree passed by the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine on 20 September of last year. At the beginning of the discussion Yevgeniy Kirillovich stressed the fact that the functioning of the Security Service has a solid legal foundation. And this is perhaps what makes it different from the former KGB.

The SBU did not start out in a vacuum. Many things still have to be done with respect to its operation, however, and it must be totally freed of that aura which is associated with the former committee in the minds of many people. There are both organizational and personnel problems. Yevgeniy Kirillovich noted, for example, that as of today a little more than half of the officer positions are filled. Nor have the intelligence and counterintelligence directorates and the directorate for combatting corruption and organized crime escaped the personnel problems. More than 800 officers lack housing, including 175 in Kiev. More than 3,500 workers in all are experiencing housing difficulties.

And just who are these people who work in one of the most difficult and dangerous professions? Fifteen percent of them have a command of foreign languages. All of the officers have special training. Here is the composition by nationality; 63% are Ukrainians, around 35% are Russians, and approximately 2% are of other nationalities.

All of the diverse difficulties are compensated for by the high level of professionalism of the SBU workers, however. And considerable credit goes to them for the fact that the situation has generally stabilized in Ukraine today. Many instances of effective performance by members of various directorates were cited during the press conference. Just one example: the campaign against smuggling. Around 1,500 masterpieces of art and culture valued at more than 3 million rubles have been seized and presented as gifts to the National Historical Museum thanks to their efforts. The figure would be considerably higher at market prices.

The heads of various directorates fielded question from reporters. It was not possible to learn everything, however. And this is not surprising. The range of the Security Service's activities is too broad. The management is therefore prepared to hold regular meetings with members of the press. One can only welcome such openness from a "closed" institution of state authority.

Law on Interior, Convoy Troops

92UM0965A Kiev GOLOS UKRAINY in Russian
No 74, 22 Apr 92 p 7

[Law of Ukraine On Interior and Convoy Troops, signed by Ukrainian President L. Kravchuk, Kiev, 26 March 1992: "Law of Ukraine 'On Interior and Convoy Troops'"]

[Text]

Article 1. Internal and convoy troops are created based on the internal troops and are part of the Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs system and are tasked to guard important state facilities and a list of corrective labor and labor medical institutions prescribed by the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers.

Article 2. The primary tasks of the internal and convoy troops are:

- security and protection of important state facilities, corrective labor and labor medical institutions, and Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs material-technical and military support facilities;
- escorting special cargoes;
- implementation of a pass system at guarded facilities;
- escorting arrested and convicted persons;
- guarding defendants during the trial process;
- pursuit and detention of arrested and convicted persons who have escaped from custody;
- participation in the surveillance of convicted persons and persons confined at labor medical facilities and fulfillment of tasks from the administration of these institutions to ensure internal order;
- rendering assistance to the militia in the maintenance of public order; and,
- participation in the elimination of the consequences of emergency situations at guarded facilities.

The use of internal and convoy troops to carry out tasks that are not provided for by this Law is prohibited.

Article 3. The activities of internal and convoy troops are structured on the principles of legality and humanness, respect for the individual, and individual rights and freedoms.

Article 4. The Ukrainian Constitution, this Law, Ukrainian Supreme Soviet decrees, other Ukrainian legislative acts, Ukrainian Presidential ukases, Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers decrees, and Ukrainian Armed Forces military regulations are the legal basis for the activities of internal and convoy troops.

Article 5. Internal and convoy troops are structured on the basis of centralized management, one-man command, and the combination of the principles of voluntary participation and universal military obligation for their manning.

Article 6. Internal and convoy troops are subordinate to the Ukrainian Ministry of Affairs.

The commander of these troops carries out direct command and control of the internal and convoy troops.

Article 7. Internal and convoy troops consist of division-sized and smaller military units and subunits to guard important state facilities, specifically, nuclear power plants and corrective labor institutions, to escort special cargoes and arrested and convicted persons, communications subunits, military institutions, educational institutions, and training units.

Deployment locations on the territory of Ukraine of the listed division-sized and smaller units and internal and convoy troops institutions are determined by the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers based upon the recommendation of the Ukrainian Minister of Internal Affairs and in coordination with local ruling bodies.

A deployment location on the territory of Ukraine for a division-sized or smaller unit or subunit can be changed if the logistics facilities to do this have been prepared.

Internal and convoy troops troop strength is prescribed by the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers based upon the Ukrainian Minister of Internal Affairs' recommendation.

The Ukrainian Minister of Internal Affairs approves the manning level of division-sized and smaller military units and institutions of the internal and convoy troops.

Article 8. Internal and convoy troops personnel consist of servicemen and individuals who have not been certified and who work according to a labor contract.

Internal and convoy troops in the future until the total transition to manning on a contract basis are manned both by contract and by conscription procedures. A contract is concluded for a three-year period and can be extended for that same period.

Internal and convoy troops servicemen take the Military Oath and have the same ranks and insignia as the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The uniform for internal and convoy troops servicemen is approved by the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers based upon the recommendation of the Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs.

The term of service in the internal and convoy troops for conscription cannot exceed the terms of service in the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

Performance of service in the indicated troops is carried out in accordance with the Regulation on the Performance of Military Service that has been approved by the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers and in accordance with military regulations.

The activities of any political parties and movements in the internal and convoy troops and the presence of servicemen, officers, extended service military personnel, or employees of these troops in them are prohibited.

Article 9. While carrying out their assigned tasks, the internal and convoy troops are obliged to:

- prepare men and equipment to secure and protect important state facilities and special cargoes during transportation;
- insure the isolation of individuals who have been detained on suspicion of having committed a crime, convicted persons, and also monitor individuals who are confined at labor medical facilities;
- be in constant readiness to render assistance, using available men and equipment, to the administration of corrective labor institutions in the elimination of cases of group disobedience and massive disorders;
- allocate men and equipment to conduct, jointly with other internal affairs organs, the investigation of individuals who have escaped from custody or surveillance;
- carry out the decisions of the courts serviced by the internal and convoy troops on taking individuals into custody, guarding them in the hall of the court or releasing them from custody;
- render assistance to the administration of guarded facilities in the elimination of the consequences of accidents and natural disasters; and,
- participate in territorial defense in areas where guarded facilities are located during wartime.

While carrying out the tasks assigned to them, the internal and convoy troops cooperate with internal affairs organs.

Article 10. In order to carry out the duties assigned to them, internal and convoy troops servicemen are granted the right to:

- require citizens and officials to comply with procedures that guarantee security and performance of duties by military details;
- detain and transfer to the administration of the guarded facility individuals who have violated the prescribed pass procedures;
- conduct pursuit, conduct detention, complete leading documents, and transfer to internal affairs or security organs criminals and individuals who have committed

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an attack against a guarded facility, guard personnel, a military detail, or who have attempted to penetrate the facility's security line or to deliver prohibited items to it;

—conduct an encirclement (blockade) of terrain areas, individual structures, and facilities during the investigation and detention of individuals who have escaped from custody;

—conduct inspections of cargoes and, when information is available about a violation of the law—and inspection of individuals at the entry control points of guarded facilities, personal inspection and interrogation of detained personnel, and examination of citizens' documents during the encirclement (blockade);

—gain access to plots of land, housing, and other premises of citizens, the premises of enterprises, institutions and organizations and conduct their inspection during the direct pursuit and detention of criminals, individuals who have escaped from custody, or who have committed an attack against a guarded facility, guard personnel, or a military detail with subsequent notification of the procurator about this within 24 hours;

—utilization of weapons and special devices on the grounds and in the manner prescribed by the Law of Ukraine "On the Militia", by Ukrainian Armed Forces military regulations and other Ukrainian legislative acts;

—use vehicles that belong to enterprises, institutions and organizations, citizens (except for vehicles of diplomatic, consular, and other representatives of foreign states and organizations or special purpose vehicles) during the direct pursuit and detention of individuals indicated in paragraph 7 of this article. The utilization of vehicles for this purpose that belong to enterprises, institutions and organizations are carried out free of charge. Reimbursement of losses and expenses for the use of citizens' vehicles is carried out in accordance with the procedures prescribed by the Law of Ukraine "On the Militia" and with other acts of legislation that are in force.

Article 11. Internal and convoy troops servicemen independently make a decision within the powers granted by this Law and other legislative acts. In the event that they commit illegal acts, they bear responsibility in accordance with this law.

Article 12. Financing of the internal and convoy troops is carried out at the expense of state budget resources and also the resources of ministries and departments who control the facilities being guarded by these troops.

Internal and convoy troops are provided combat and special vehicles, weapons, special devices, and personnel individual protection devices in accordance with the tasks being carried out by them, logistics resources and food within the centralized supply procedures in the Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs system.

Construction of provision of facilities for quartering units (subunits) of internal and convoy troops is carried out according to the standards prescribed for Ukrainian Armed Forces servicemen.

Article 13. The state provides social and legal guarantees for internal and convoy troops servicemen and to their family members in accordance with the Law of Ukraine "On Social and Legal Protection of Servicemen and Their Family Members" and the Law of Ukraine "On Pension Support of Internal Affairs Organ Servicemen and Employees."

Internal and convoy troops servicemen who participate in guarding facilities have the right to receive labor and social-everyday life benefits that have been provided for employees of these facilities for special labor conditions.

The provisions of the legislation on legal and social protection of employees of these institutions (including monetary salaries) that is in force extends to internal and convoy troops servicemen who participate in guarding corrective labor institutions, labor medical facilities and surveillance of the individuals contained in them.

Article 14. The Ukrainian Minister of Internal Affairs monitors the activities of the internal and convoy troops.

The Ukrainian Procurator General and procurators subordinate to him carry out surveillance of compliance with the law in the activities of internal and convoy troops.

[Signed] L. Kravchuk

President of Ukraine

Kiev

March 26, 1992

Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Decree on Putting into Force the Law of Ukraine "On Internal and Convoy Troops"

The Ukrainian Supreme Soviet decrees:

1. To enter into force the Law of Ukraine "On Internal and Convoy Troops" from the moment of its publication.

2. The Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers will determine the location of internal and convoy troops division-sized and smaller military units and institutions by May 1, 1992.

[Signed] I. Plyushch

Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Chairman

Kiev

March 26, 1992

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